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Antidiscrimination Laws and the
First Amendment
DavidE. Bernstein*
The United States Supreme Court's decision last Term in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale,' holding that the Boy Scouts had a First Amendment right to
exclude a gay adult scoutmaster, is one of the most significant and positive
recent developments in civil liberties jurisprudence. To understand why,
consider the dilemma facing Sister Maria Hernandez, principal of St. Helen's
Catholic High School for Girls.
Overall, Sister Hemandez's (fictional) school, located in a run-down area
of Los Angeles, is doing extremely well. Sister Hernandez and the rest of the
staff of St. Helen's are proud of the difference the school makes in the lives of
its students. Ninety percent of the students at St. Helen's are from families with
incomes below the poverty line, and most are from neighborhoods where
teenage pregnancy is rampant. Tuition is low, ninety percent of St. Helen's
students go on to college, and only two students out of hundreds enrolled at St.
Helen's have become pregnant over the last decade.
Sister Hernandez's problem is that Mary Smith, an unmarried tenth-grade
English teacher, revealed her pregnancy to Sister Hemandez this morning. Ms.
Smith told Sister Hernandez that the father was "out of the picture." Not
surprisingly, Sister Hernandez expressed great concern about the effect Ms.
Smith's pregnancy would have on the school's ability to promote its religious
message of abstaining from sex until marriage, and its practical message of
personal responsibility, which, the school teaches, includes not getting pregnant
without the expectation of emotional support and financial assistance from a
responsible husband. Sister Hernandez reminded Ms. Smith that Ms. Smith
agreed to abide by Catholic teachings and serve as a role model for students
when she took the job three years ago. Sister Hernandez expressed sympathy for
Ms. Smith's situation, but asked her to resign quietly for the sake of the school
and its students.
Ms. Smith refused, and added that an attorney advised her that St. Helen's
would be liable for both sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination if it
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fired her. She offered to resign in exchange for $100,000, one-tenth of St.
Helen's's annual budget. "I need the money for my child," she explained.
If this scenario had arisen from the 1970s until June of 2000, the school's
attorney would likely have advised Sister Hemandez to either retain Ms. Smith
or negotiate a settlement. Courts often were extremely reluctant to find that
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws conflicted with First Amendment rights,
so they interpreted the relevant facts to avoid any such conflict.' Moreover,
courts generally held that even if First Amendment rights were infringed by
antidiscrimination laws, the government had a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination sufficient to trump enforcement of those rights. Precedent thus
suggested that St. Helen's's (and its faculty's, parents', and students') rights to
freedom of speech,3 freedom of expressive association,4 and free exercise of
religion' would all have had to yield to antidiscrimination law.'

2. See David Cole, Hangingwith the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists,and the
Right ofAssociation, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 203, 243.

3. Free speech rights are potentially implicated because having a pregnant,
unmarried woman on the faculty may send a message to the public that the school does
not wish to convey. Cf Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995) (holding that parade organizers could not be compelled to
allow a group with a message not endorsed by the organizers to march in their parade;
the court did not clearly state whether this was a free speech right or an expressive
association right).
4. Expressive association rights are potentially implicated because having Ms.
Smith on the faculty may interfere with the ability of the school's students and faculty
to associate for the purposes of learning and promoting Catholic values, and of learning
and promoting the school's view of what constitutes personal responsibility. Cf Pines
v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 879 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that restricting listings in
the "Christian Yellow Pages" implicated the right to expressive association, but
upholding a ban on the practice anyway).
5. Free exercise rights are potentially implicated because being forced to retain Ms.
Smith may interfere with the school's ability to fulfill its religious mission and with the
parents' and students' rights to arrange an education in an appropriate religious
environment. Cf Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d
932, 961 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that state interference with a Christian school's ability
to make employment decisions on religious grounds violated the free exercise clause),
vacated on ripeness grounds,477 U.S. 619 (1986).
Ministerial employment decisions are constitutionally exempt from liability for fear
that scrutiny of such decisions will lead to excessive entanglement with religion in
violation of the First Amendment. However, courts have defined the ministerial role
narrowly, and have explicitly excluded lay teachers at Catholic schools from that
definition. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324,
331 (3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172-73 (2d Cir.

1993).
6. See infra note 15. As we shall see, Sister Hernandez would be especially
vulnerable to liability if, in the past, she had counseled rather than fired other members
of the staff who had violated Catholic doctrine in less visible ways. See infra note 17 and
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When conflicts between antidiscrimination laws and First Amendment
ights first arose in the 1970s, courts refused to acknowledge that
antidiscrimination laws sometimes trespassed on constitutional rights.! Courts
instead relied on Supreme Court dicta to the effect that invidious private
discrimination is not accorded affirmative constitutional protection even when
constitutional rights appear to be at issue.8
The Supreme Court finally acknowledged in the 1980s that
antidiscrimination laws could potentially impinge on First Amendment rights?
Instead of enforcing those rights, however, the Court either denied that the First
Amendment was implicated in any particular case,' ° or applied a toothless
"compelling interest" test that in effect exempted antidiscrimination laws from
the strictures of the First Amendment."
Lower courts seized and expanded upon these decisions to the point where
antidiscrimination laws gradually became a significant menace to freedom of

accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (implausibly denying that
forcing a segregationist school to integrate would have any impact on the school's ability
to propound its pro-segregation message); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d
1144 (4th Cir. 1980) (denying a free exercise defense to a private school that opposed
interracial dating, purportedly on religious grounds); Brown v. Dade Christian Sch., Inc.,
556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (evading a conflict betveen a school's claimed religious
belief in segregation and the Free Exercise Clause by denying that the school's
segregationist views were based in religious doctrine).
8. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,78 (1984); Runyon, 427 US. at
176; Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,470 (1973). Some courts continued to ignore
obvious constitutional conflicts with antidiscrimination laws through the 1990s. See,
eg., Wisconsin ex rel. Sprague v. City of Madison, No. 94-2983, 1996 Wis. App. LEXIS
1205, at *9 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 1996) (denying that an ordinance forcing housemates to
rent a room in their house to a lesbian implicated any First Amendment right, despite
clear implication of the right of intimate association).
9. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984)
(acknowledging potential conflict between right of expressive association and public
accommodations law); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (assuming
arguendo that the IRS impinged on a religious organization's free exercise rights when
it denied the organization tax-exempt status because of the organization's religiouslybased policy against interracial dating).
10. E.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-25 (arguing unpersuasively that forcing an
organization dedicated to promoting the interests of young men to admit women would
not affect the organization's expressive association rights).
11. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 (denying in both cases that First Amendment rights were
impinged, but adding that if they were impinged, the impingement was justified by the
government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination). See generally Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. at 574 (assuming arguendo that free exercise rights were violated by the
govemment, but ruling against the university because of the government's compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination in private education against African-Americans).
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speech, freedom of expressive association, and religious freedom. For example,
courts held that an injunction creating a prior restraint on speech was appropriate
in a hostile environment case; 2 that a Black separatist organization could be
compelled to admit whites to its meetings; a and that the government could force
a Catholic university to fund student organizations that engaged in political and
social advocacy contrary to Catholic doctrine. 4
Private religious schools like our fictional St. Helen's found their rights in
jeopardy. For example, three federal district court precedents almost directly on
point--one of which was decided as recently as 1998-vindicated Ms. Smith's
position that
a Christian school may not fire an unmarried teacher for becoming
5
pregnant.'

12. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991). For other examples of free speech rights yielding to antidiscrimination laws, see
infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
13. See In re Southgate v. United African Movement, Nos. MPA95-0851, PA950031, 1997 WL 1051933 (N.Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights June 30, 1997). For
other examples of expressive association rights yielding to antidiscrimination laws, see
infranotes 49-84, 134-37 and accompanying text.
14. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ.,
536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). For other examples of free exercise rights yielding to
antidiscrimination laws, see infra notes 41-46, 131 and accompanying text.
15. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d
Cir. 1993); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Dolter
v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980). One case involved a librarian
at a fundamentalist religious school who was allegedly fired for giving birth out of
wedlock. See Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 804. The court held that the librarian's status as
a role model for students did not make obedience to church doctrine regarding sex a bona
fide occupational qualification, and that the school had no viable First Amendment
defense to the librarian's discrimination claim. Id. at 809-10.
In the second case, an English teacher at a Catholic school sued the school for sex
discrimination after being fired for becoming pregnant out of wedlock. See Dolter,483
F. Supp. at 267. The court denied the school's motion for summary judgment, holding
that if the school dismissed the teacher specifically because of her pregnancy, as opposed
to a more general concern about violating the school's moral code, it would be liable for
sex discrimination regardless of constitutional considerations. Id. at 270-71.
The third and most recent case, also involving an unmarried teacher fired by a
Christian school, held plainly that "[r]estrictions on pregnancy are not permitted because
they are gender discriminatory by definition." See Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995
F. Supp. 340, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). The court denied the school's summary judgment
motion, and instead sent the case to the jury to decide whether the teacher's dismissal
was based on fornication-in which case the school would not be liable for sex
discrimination because both men and women can engage in that particular sin-or if the
dismissal was illicitly based on the teacher's pregnancy. Id. at 344. The court repudiated
the school's constitutional defenses. Id. at 346-47. But cf Lewis ex rel. Murphy v.
Buchanan, No. 429871, 1979 WL 29147 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 1979) (holding that a
Catholic school had a constitutional right to refuse employment to a gay music teacher
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Thus, until recently, the landscape looked bleak for organizations such as
St. Helen's seeking to assert First Amendment defenses to discrimination
lawsuits. 6 Fortunately for Sister Hernandez and St. Helen's, precedent has
recently swung dramatically. 7 Most important, on the last day of its October

because the decision was based on the school pastor's sincerely-held religious beliefs).
Precedents are divided on the related issue of whether a religious school may
lawfully fire a married pregnant teacher who wishes to keep teaching in contravention

ofthe school's religiously-based view that mothers with young children should not work
outside the home. CompareDayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n,
766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985) (reversing the district court and holding, over a dissent, that
a church school had a constitutional right to do so), rev'd on ripeness grounds,477 U.S.
619 (1986), with McLeod v. Providence Christian Sch., 408 N.W.2d 146, 152 (Mich. Ct.

App. 1987) (concluding that any such right was overridden by the government's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination). Dayton ChristianSchools has been
roundly criticized.
See, e.g.,
Robert M. O'Neil, Religious Freedom and
Nondiscrimination:State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785,

799 (1999) ("Surely a state antibias agency could today show a compelling interest in the
continuing employability of highly competent pregnant teachers, however strongly the
school might believe a mother's place was in the home.... Only a failure to assess

properly the powerful government interests would lead a court to reject the claims of a
latter day Linda Hoskinson."). In fact, Linda Hoskinson, the teacher in the case, chose
to work in a conservative Christian environment, rather than in a public school or secular
private school. See Dayton ChristianSch., 766 F.2d at 934. Having gained the religious
benefits of working in this environment, she chose to litigate when the religious rules of
the school worked to her disadvantage. Why this presents such an obviously compelling

case for the government to override the rights of the school and its parents is never
explained by Professor O'Neil. It is also worth noting that Ms. Hoskinson remained
"employable" by the vast majority ofschools not run by conservative Christian churches.

16. Christian organizations did win some cases on the merits at trial. See Boyd v.
Harding Acad. of Memphis, 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996); Gosche v. Culvert High Sch.,
947 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ohio 1998); Harvey v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 533
F. Supp. 949 (W.D.N.C. 1982). See generallyCline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, No.
98-3527,2000 WL 272258, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 14,2000) (denying summary judgment
to Catholic school in pregnancy discrimination case on statutory grounds). Of course,
such victories are pyrrhic, given the costs of litigation.
17. A key turning point came in 1995, when the Supreme Court unanimously held
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Biseual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995), that Massachusetts could not lawfully force the organizers of a St. Patrick's Day
parade to allow a gay rights group to march under its banner. The question that remained
was whether Hurley was an anomalous opinion restricted to its facts, or whether it
represented anew determination on the part of the Court to protect the Amendment, even
at the expense of the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. See Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speec, and Gay and Lesbian
Equality, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 91 (1998) (noting that language in Hurley "raise[d]
the question whether Hurley indicates that the Court might disturb the Roberts doctrine

if presented with the opportunity"); Kristine M. Zaleskas, Pride,Prejudice orPolitical
Correctness? An Analysis ofHurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group
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1999 Term the Supreme Court ruled in Dale that the Boy Scouts of America
("BSA") had a First Amendment right to defy a New Jersey public
accommodations law and refuse to hire an openly gay man as an assistant scout
leader.'8 The majority held that forcing the BSA to hire Dale would violate the
BSA's First Amendment right to expressive association because Dale's presence
in the BSA would impinge on the BSA's ability to convey its belief that
homosexual activity is immoral.'

9

The media has treated Dale mainly as a battle in the ongoing Kulturkampf
between gay rights activists and their conservative opponents.2" However, the
underlying moral rectitude of the BSA's exclusion of homosexuals was not
legally relevant in Dale. Rather, Dale was about the right of non-profit, private,
expressive organizations of all ideological stripes-including church schools
such as St. Helen's-to set their membership and employment rules free from
government interference."
More broadly, Dale has significantly reduced the threat antidiscrimination
laws once posed to constitutionally-protected civil liberties. Although Dale was
a 5-4 decision, with the conservative Justices in the majority, all nine Justices
seemed to agree that First Amendment rights must be enforced even when the

of Boston, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 507, 547 (1996) ("In Hurley, the Court leaves
as an open question the status of the Roberts v. UnitedStates Jaycees line of cases.").
18. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
19. Id. at 2453.
20. E.g., Editorial, A Triumphfor Homophobia,ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June
29, 2000, at B6 ('The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed a policy of discrimination and
hypocrisy."); Scouts Can Bar Gays, Court Rules, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 29,
2000, at Al ("A deeply divided Supreme Court dealt a setback to the gay rights
movement yesterday."); David Usbome, Setbackfor Gay Movement as Court Rules
Against Sacked Scoutmaster, THE INDEPENDENT, June 29, 2000, at 14 ("The gay
movement in the United States suffered a setback yesterday."). For a welcome, albeit
somewhat misleading, exception, see Kate Zemicke, Scouts'Successful Ban on Gays Is
Followed by Loss in Support, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al ("[t]he ruling did not
address the merits of the ban on gays, only whether the Boy Scouts is a private group,
and so has the right to set its own membership rules").
21. Antidiscrimination activists sometimes seem to lose sight of the fact that civil
liberties protections that at times harm one group often benefit that group at another time.
For example, at the same time gay rights organizations were fighting to force the
organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade to allow a gay organization to march
under its own banner in Hurley, a California judge denied a petition by an anti-gay
organization calling itself "Normal People" to march in San Diego's annual gay pride
parade. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557; K. L. Billingsley, Judge Bars Oppositionfrom Gay
Parade,WASH. TIMES, July 16, 1994, at 43.
In Daleitself, Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty, informally assisted by the
Author of this Article, filed a brief detailing how historically homosexuals had suffered
from lack of robust protection of the right of association, and how they benefitted when
the right of association was protected more vigorously.
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implementation of antidiscrimination laws is at stake. The majority and dissent
disagreed over whether the BSA truly expressed an anti-homosexual activity
message, and over whether forcing the BSA to hire a gay assistant scoutmaster
would interfere with any anti-homosexual activity message the BSA was
propounding. However, both sides agreed that the relevant issue was whether
New Jersey's public accommodations law, which required the BSA to hire an
openly-gay scoutmaster, infringed on the BSA's First Amendment rights. If the
law did so, the BSA would emerge victorious.
Despite lip service paid to precedents applying the compelling interest test
to overcome First Amendment restrictions on antidiscrimination laws, neither
side discussed whether the government has a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against homosexuals. As noted above, in the 1980s, the Court
applied a special, languid compelling interest test to antidiscrimination laws
when First Amendment defenses were raised? Dale, by contrast, suggests the
Court has reached a consensus that defendants charged with violating
antidiscrimination laws are generally entitled to the same full First Amendment
protection as defendants charged with violating other important laws.P
Antidiscrimination laws, then, have been constitutionally normalized.
Part I ofthis Article discusses the development of Supreme Court doctrine
regarding First Amendment challenges to the enforcement of antidiscrimination
laws. The Court was initially reluctant to acknowledge that actions that violate
antidiscrimination laws sometimes implicate First Amendment rights. When the
Court confronted cases that squarely presented valid First Amendment defenses
to antidiscrimination laws, it applied a flimsy compelling interest test that
shielded antidiscrimination laws from normal First Amendment scrutiny. This
neglect of core civil liberties resulted from confused free exercise doctrine,
misinterpretation of prior precedents, and a willful decision to privilege
antidiscrimination laws over civil liberties.
Part II of this Article discusses attempted justifications by courts and
academics for applying the toothless compelling interest test in conflicts between

22. The Court consistently held without coherent explanation that enforcement of
state laws banning discrimination is a sufficiently compelling interest to trump
constitutional defenses to enforcement of that law, even when the discrimination at issue
is not banned by federal law, and even when the effect on the protected class would be
negligible. See David E. Bernstein, Sax DiscriminationLawts Versus Civil Liberties,
1999 U. C. LEGAL F. 133, 166.
23. However, the four dissenters would still apparently give antidiscrimination
laws a bit of what looks like special treatment. Justice Stevens, writing for the four,
argued that in expressive association cases, courts should not take defendants' purported
beliefs at face value, but should investigate whether these beliefs are merely a cover for
status-based discrimination. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2471
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The only rationale they gave for this distinction was the
potential negative effect on antidiscrimination laws of adopting the contrary position.
See id.
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the First Amendment and antidiscrimination laws. Rationales have ranged from
Congress' purported intent to eradicate discrimination by passing Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to the anti-caste attributes of the Reconstruction
Amendments. As discussed in Part II, all of these arguments fail.
Part II also examines the threat reliance on the compelling interest test
posed to the rights of speech, expressive association, and the free exercise of
religion. Lower courts reasonably interpreted Supreme Court precedents as
holding that unless First Amendment freedoms were targeted directly and
specifically, antidiscrimination laws-promulgated at any level of government,
and protecting any group-are exempt from normal constitutional limitations.
Dale, discussed in detail in Part I, reversed this trend. The Court affirmed
what should be obvious under our constitutional system: that free speech and
associated rights protected by the First Amendment trump statutory
antidiscrimination provisions. As Part IV of this Article explains, Dale'sholding
signals a new willingness by the Court to take the First Amendment seriously
when antidiscrimination laws are at stake. However, Dale applies directly only
to non-profit, primarily expressive associations. Religious associations will
especially benefit from Dale. Dale will ensure that their ability to convey their
values will not be undermined by religious dissenters who try to force
themselves on religious associations via antidiscrimination laws. Dale should
also end the worrisome spectacle of courts and government agencies neglecting
freedom of speech in deference to antidiscrimination laws.24
I. THE SUPREME COURT, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT THROUGH THE 1980s
Cases involving conflicts between antidiscrimination laws and the First
Amendment did not arise until many years after passage of the landmark 1964
Civil Rights Act.25 Few defendants in antidiscrimination cases brought in the
1960s and 1970s claimed that their First Amendment rights were violated, and

24. For further discussion of the implications of Dale, see David E. Bernstein, The
Right ofExpressiveAssociation and PrivateUniversities'RacialPreferences and Speech
Codes, WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. (forthcoming 2001).

25. Had a case pitting the First Amendment rights of a private, non-commercial
association against an antidiscrimination law arisen during the Warren Court era, the
result would have been unpredictable. In the 1960s, even the most liberal jurists agreed
that members of private clubs had a constitutional right to choose their members without
government interference. Justice Arthur Goldberg, for example, wrote: "Prejudice and
bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to
close his home or club to any person ... solely on the basis of personal prejudices." Bell
v. State, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). On the other hand,
antidiscrimination advocates lost very few cases before the Warren Court, and the
Warren Court would almost certainly have interpreted "private club" narrowly.
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the Supreme Court made it clear that discrimination, as such, was entitled to no
constitutional protection.'
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, courts increasingly began to confront
First Amendment defenses to antidiscrimination laws. The courts' (including the
Supreme Court's) initial instinct was to evade the relevant issues and uphold the
laws by finding that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of expression
did not conflict with antidiscrimination law in any given case.
Such evasion was not necessary when free exercise defenses to
antidiscrimination laws were raised, however. Under then-current doctrine,
courts needed to apply only a watered-down version of the compelling interest
test, and could then in good conscience uphold enforcement of the
antidiscrimination law at issue. Thus, in 1983 in Bob Jones University v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that free exercise rights could be overcome by
the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education.
The courts' willful evasion of freedom of expression issues and the
compelling interest precedents from free exercise cases coalesced in 1984 in
Roberts v. UnitedStates Jaycees,2 written by Justice William Brennan. Justice
Brennan relied on highly-dubious reasoning to find that expressive association
rights were not infringed upon in Roberts, and also held that even if such
infringement occurred it was justified by the government's compelling interests.
Roberts quickly became the leading precedent in cases where constitutional
defenses were asserted against the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.
A. Runyon v. McCrary: Sidestepping the Issue
In Runyon v. McCrary,' the Supreme Court rejected a freedom of
association defense to an antidiscrimination claim against a private school. The
Court explained that while invidious private discrimination may be characterized
as an exercise of freedom of association, it is not accorded affirmative
constitutional protection. Applying an antidiscrimination statute to prohibit
private, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to African-American
students would not violate the right of free association where "'there is no
showing that discontinuance of (the) discriminatory admission practices would
inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of any ideas or dogma."'"0 In the
absence of a valid First Amendment claim, "the Constitution ... places no value

26. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Norvood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,470 (1973).
27. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
28. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
29. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
30. Id at 176 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).
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on discrimination," and "[i]nvidious private discrimination... has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections."'"
The Court failed to explain how forcing a segregationist school to admit
African-American children would not impair the school's ability to teach that
segregation was good, but the Court did not have to. The main issue in the case
was whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applied to private school segregation.
Freedom of association was a side issue, and none of the briefs supporting the
schools' position argued that the schools' ability to promote segregation would
be compromised? 2 There was no evidence on the record, and no argument was
made in the briefs, that compelled integration would interfere with any person's
right of expressive association.
Thus, the Court was able to find for the African-American plaintiffs while
sidestepping the troubling First Amendment issues raised by the case. However,
the Court did not clearly state that it found no conflict in this particular case
between expressive rights and the law in question. As a result of this omission,
some readers, including the Court itself in Roberts eight years later,33 incorrectly
interpreted Runyon as holding that antidiscrimination laws trump the right to
expressive association.
B. The FreeExercise Cases
As the scope and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws expanded, the
potential for conflict between such laws and First Amendment rights expanded
as well. This was especially true in the free exercise context. In Sherbert v.
Verner,;' the Court held that generally applicable laws that interfere with the free
exercise of religion, even indirectly, must pass the compelling interest test.35
The compelling interest test had become well-established during the Warren
Court era,' when the Court used it to expand constitutional rights at the expense

31. Id. (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 469-70).
32. The Author of this Article has read each of the relevant briefs.
33. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
34. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

35. Id. at 406-08.
36. Many scholars trace the origins of the compelling interest test to Korematsu v.
UnitedStates, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944). In the course of upholding the constitutionality
of the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the Court wrote that "all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigidscrutiny." Id. at 216 (emphasis added). The
Court gradually applied this "strict scrutiny" test to all fundamental rights protected by
the Constitution; the government could invade these rights only if it had a compelling
interest in doing so, and used the least restrictive means in achieving its objectives.
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of the state?' Gerald Gunther described the scrutiny given to laws under the
compelling interest test as "strict in theory and fatal in fact. 3
However, the Court rarely applied "true" strict scrutiny in free exercise
cases involving generally-applicable laws. As Eugene Volokh explains, "[b]oth
the strict scrutiny test's literal terms and the case law that has emerged under it
in religious freedom cases are so vague that they don't meaningfully constrain
' In fact, the vast majority of "neutral"
ajudge's range of options."39
laws were
upheld against free exercise challenges
Sherbertforced courts to confront conflicts between antidiscrimination laws
and the First Amendment. But because of the weakness of the compelling
interest test in the free exercise context, and judicial solicitude for
antidiscrimination claims during the Burger years, parties claiming a free
exercise exemption from antidiscrimination laws generally were unsuccessful.
Courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently held that the state's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination outweighed any claimed free
exercise right.
The Fifth Circuit opinion in EEOCv. MississippiCollege4' was the first to
declare, albeit in dictum, that the government's compelling interest in enforcing
an antidiscrimination law overcomes free exercise protections. The Ninth
Circuit followed Mississippi
College's dictum two years later in EEOCv. Pacific
4
PressPublishingAss 'n.
A conflict between free exercise rights and antidiscrimination law reached
the Supreme Court in Bob Jones. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") denied

37. E.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
38. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrineon a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86
HAR. L. REv. 1,8 (1972).
39. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Lawy Modelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA
L. REv. 1465, 1494 (1999).
40. See Thomas C.Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes in PrivateandPublic
Education, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 539 (1999) (noting that the Sherberttest was
"ineffectual").
41. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. Id. at 489.
43. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). Pacific Press, a church-affiliated publisher, had
fired an employee who violated church teachings by complaining to outside authorities
about sex discrimination. Id at 1275. The court acknowledged that disciplining Pacific
Press for this action burdened the Press's free exercise of religion. Id. at 1279. The court
concluded, however, that the government's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination justified the burden. Id. at 1279-80; see also Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 879 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that restricting listings in "Christian Yellow
Pages" to Christians was illegal, and, although the law in question violated the right to
expressive association, that violation was justified by the government's compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination based on religious affiliation).
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Bob Jones University, a private Christian school, tax-exempt status because it
defied public policy by banning interracial dating. The university argued that its
policy was based on a sincere belief that miscegenation violates Christian
doctrine.' The IRS decision, the school argued, therefore violated its free
exercise rights.s The Court found in favor of the IRS, holding that Bob Jones'
free exercise rights could be overcome by the government's "fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education."46
The Supreme Court overruled Sherbert in 1990, holding that the Free
Exercise Clause is not usually implicated by general laws that happen to impinge
on religious practice.47 In the meantime, precedents from free exercise cases
applying a feeble compelling interest test spilled over into other First
Amendment areas, threatening to weaken freedom of speech and freedom of
expressive association. The key case in this regard, Roberts, involved expressive
association and was decided just a year after Bob Jones.

C. Roberts and the Expressive Association Cases
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court announced that freedom to associate in an
expressive organization was a fundamental right protected by the First
Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech, religion, assembly, and

44. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602 (1983).
45. Id. at 603.

46. Id. at 604. The Court also noted that denial of tax benefits for forbidding
interracial dating was less restrictive than prohibiting Bob Jones from enforcing its
policy. The Court wrote that "[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial
impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools
from observing their religious tenets." Id. at 603-04.
For commentary and criticism, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE
STATE 249-51 (1993); BETTE NovrT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION 245 (1997); Dee-Ann Burdette & Nancy Parker, Bob Jones University v.
United States: Payingthe PriceofPrejudice-Lossof Tax-Exempt Status, 35 MERCER
L. REV. 937 (1984); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: The Supreme Court: Nomos and
Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4,62-67 (1983); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race,
Religion, andPublicPolicy: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 SUP. CT. REV.
1; Charles 0. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax PolicyAnalysis of Bob Jones University v.
United States, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1365-66 (1983); Douglas Laycock, Tax
Exemptions for Racially DiscriminatoryReligious Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259, 275
(1982); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal
ProtectionApproach to Establishment ClauseAdjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

311 (1986).
Freed and Polsby commented, "No one will deny that the governmental interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education, as elsewhere in life, is 'compelling': but
that does not tell us why it takes precedence over every other constitutional and social
value." Freed & Polsby, supra, at 22.
47. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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petition.' As Roberts illustrates, however, the Burger Court was distinctly
uninterested in protecting the right of expressive association when it interfered
with the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. 4'
The United States Jaycees is a leadership and networking organization for
young business leaders." Until the mid-1980s, the Jaycees accepted only men
as members, but admitted women as associate members.5 Associate members
could participate in Jaycees activities, but could not vote, run for office, or
receive awards' Two Minnesota chapters violated national rules and admitted
women as full members. The state chapters claimed that the national
organization's policy violated Minnesota's public accommodations law."
The national Jaycees successfully defended its membership policy on
constitutional grounds before the Eighth Circuit.' The court found that
Minnesota's public accommodations law violated the Jaycees' members' First
Amendment right to associate to achieve expressive ends. The court concluded
that the Jaycees raison d'etre, assisting young men, would be altered by the
compelled admission of women as voting members55 Moreover, the court noted
that national, state, and local chapters of the Jaycees (including the Minnesota
chapter) took positions on a wide range of political issues, and by allowing
women to vote "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast (could]
reasonably be expected."5 6

48. The most prominent case in this was NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.Patterson,357
U.S. 449 (1958), a case in which the Court quashed Alabama's attempt to subpoena the
state NAACP's membership list. While NAACP is often seen as protecting a general
right of freedom of association, the Court's focus was on the right to associate for
expressive purposes. For example, the Court stated "that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech:' HL at 460. The Court added that "it is immaterial whether
the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, cconomic, religious
or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom
to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." Id. at 460-61.
49. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-29 (1984).
50. Id. at 612-13.
51. Id. at 613.

52. Id.
53. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764,766 (Minn. 1981).
54. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'dsub
nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
55. Id.at 1570. The court stated: "It is natural to expect that an association
containing both men and women will not be so single-minded about advancing men's
interests as an association of men only." Id. at 1571.

56. Id.
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Minnesota appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed in RobertsY
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, was joined by four other
Justices. Two Justices recused themselves, Justice O'Connor filed a concurring
opinion, and Justice Rehnquist concurred without opinion.
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the Court had "long understood as
implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."" Brennan
admitted that the Jaycees' central purpose was "promoting the interests of young
men."59 Brennan also conceded that political advocacy was a "not insubstantial
part" of the Jaycees' activities.'
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan found no evidence that the compelled
acceptance of women as Jaycees would "change the content or impact of the
organization's speech."' According to Brennan, admitting women required no
change in the organization's central purpose-"promoting the interests of young
men."62 The law also did not prevent the Jaycees from denying membership
based on ideological or philosophical differences.63
The claim that admitting women would inherently change the Jaycees'
message was not "supported by the record,"' 4 according to Justice Brennan, but
instead relied "solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests

57. For commentary on Roberts, see Neal E. Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees, 34
CATH. U. L. REv. 901, 913 (1985); Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom ofAssociation After
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1879 (1984); William P.
Marshall,Discriminationandthe Right ofAssociation, 81 NV. U. L. REV. 68,69 (1986);
Pamela Griffin, Note, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: First
Amendment Limitations upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047, 1047-48 (1985); Ann H.
Jameson, Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: DiscriminatoryMembership Policy
of a National Organization Held Not Protected by First Amendment Freedom of
Association, 34 CATH. U. L. Ruv. 1055, 1056 (1985); Patricia E. Willard, Roberts v.
United States Jaycees and the Affirmation of State Authority to Prohibit Sex
Discrimination in Public Accommodations: Distinguishing "Private" Activity, the
Exerciseof ExpressiveAssociation, and the Practiceof Discrimination,38 RUTGoERS L.

REv. 341, 345-56 (1986).
58. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
59. Id. at 627.
60. Id.at 626 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
61. Id. at 627-28. In fact, Rotary International's amicus brief pointed to the
"gender gap" in political views. Brief of Amici Curiae Rotary Int'l, Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724).
62. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
63. Id. at 627. Assumedly, for example, the Jaycees could deny membership to
women who refused to promise that they would devote their energies to promoting the
interests of young men.
64. Id.
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and perspectives of men and women" that "may or may not have a statistical
basis."6 Brennan concluded that "[in the absence of a showing far more
substantial than that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the
sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing women
to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of
the organization's speech.""6 Brennan added that "any claim that admission of
women as full voting members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the
very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best"7
Skeptical commentators have argued that Justice Brennan's assertion that
forcing the Jaycees to admit women was unrelated to the suppression of ideas
and would not hamper the organization's ability to express its views is "not
believable";' his justification for this assertion is said to have been "woefully
inadequate." 69 Neal Devins and Marc Linder submit that it is highly unlikely
that an all-male electorate will have the same views on a variety of issues as a
sex-integrated electorate. George Kateb points out that the Court's implicit
claim that young women would use their membership to "promot[e] the interests
of young men" is dubious, at best 7" Arguably, the very purpose ofrequiring the
Jaycees to admit young women is to persuade young men that their interests are
indistinguishable from those of young women! 2
In fact, Justice Brennan may be technically correct that it is theoretically
possi'ble that an all-male organization that is forced to admit women as members
will remain as devoted to the interests of young men as it was previously, that
the women who join the group will have the same average political and social
views as the men, and that women who choose to join the group would not try
to change its mission. On the other hand, it seems likely (though perhaps
unprovable ex ante) that admitting women would affect the Jaycees' mission and
political program' 3 As Linder suggests, it would be absurd to argue that forcing
the KKKto admit Afican-Americans would have no effect on the organization's

65. Id. at 628.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 627.
68. See George Kateb, The Value ofAssociation, in FREDO.M OF ASSOCATION 35,
39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
69. Devins, supranote 57, at 913. Devins suggests that the Court could have
avoided some of these problems by holding that the Jaycees had to admit women as
members, but could still restrict to male members the privilege of voting on the

organization's public policy positions. See Devins, supranote 57, at 914.
70. Devins, supranote 57, at 914; Linder, supranote 57, at 1892.
71. Kateb, supra note 68, at 55.
72. See Kateb, supranote 68, at 55.
73. See NANcY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 194 (1998). One
wonders how Justice Brennan expected the Jaycees to police their new female members

to ensure that they would perpetually vote for and act in the interests of young men at the
same rate as their male members did.
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philosophy7 4 One does not have to engage in stereotyping, Linder continues, to
recognize that "[t]he impact on the expressive activities of the Jaycees resulting
from the admission of women would be far less dramatic, but no less certain.""
Although Justice Brennan's rationale for finding no conflict between the
First Amendment and Minnesota's public accommodations laws seems
unpersuasive, if the Court had limited its holding to that issue, the case would
have been limited to its facts and the damage to the First Amendment would
have been minor. Instead Brennan emphasized that "even -ifenforcement of the
Act causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate
purposes." '6 To the extent Minnesota's public accommodations law infringed
on the Jaycees' right to freedom of association, it did so to advance compelling
interests, i.e., eliminatinggender discrimination and ensuring "equal access to
'
publicly available goods and services."77
Because compelling government
interests were served, the Jaycees' right to expressive association was trumped. 8
The Court analogized discriminatory practices to "violence or other types
of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact."79 Such activities "are entitled to no constitutional
protection."" The Court cited Runyon for this position. As we have seen,
Runyon held that the First Amendment does not protect freedom of association
in the absence of proof that the infringement on association will affect the
relevant group's ability to communicate its message."' The Roberts Court,
however, interpreted Runyon as holding that discriminatory conduct is not
protected by the First Amendment even when freedom of speech is impinged,
so long as the infringement on expression is "incidental" to the law's regulation
of discriminatory conduct, because discriminatory conduct is analogous to

74. See Linder, supra note 57, at 1892.
75. Linder, supra note 57, at 1892. Moreover, Rosenblum points out that the
impact of the Jaycees' political activity could depend on whether the organization was
all-male or sex-integrated. For example, the impact of support for the Equal Rights
Amendment by an all-male organization could very well be different than support from
a sex-integrated organization. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 73, at 196.
76. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
77. Id. at 624.
78. "As we have explained, acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of
publicly available goods, services and other advantages cause unique evils that
government has a compelling interest to prevent." Id. at 628.
79. Id.
80. Id.; cf Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 284
(Alaska 1994) (rejecting a free exercise defense to a fair housing law and explaining that
"[b]ecause Swanner's religiously impelled actions trespass on the private right of
unmarried couples to not be unfairly discriminated against in housing, he cannot be
granted an exemption from the housing anti-discrimination laws").
81. See supranotes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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tortious or criminal misconductY The Court implicitly determined that because
of the particularly destructive nature of discriminatory conduct, a balancing test,
rather than a traditional strict scrutiny test, should be applied to a First
Amendment challenge to an antidiscrimination law that incidentally affects
expression.'
Justice O'Connor's concurrence inRobertsacknowledged that "[p]rotection
of the association's right to define its membership derives from the recognition
that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the
selection of members is the definition of that voice."' O'Connor nevertheless
concurred because she found that the Jaycees were primarily a "nonexpressive,"
"commercial" associations even though they engaged in a "not insubstantial
volume of [constitutionally] protected... activities,:"S Primarily commercial
associations, according to O'Connor, may not claim an expressive association
exemption from antidiscrimination laws.
In BoardofDirectors ofRotary Internationalv. Rotary Club ofDuarte,1
the Court applied its Roberts analysis to uphold a California appellate court
ruling that Rotary International ("RI") could not revoke the membership of a
local Rotary club that had accepted two female members in violation of national
Rotary policy. After analyzing the purposes and functions of Rotary clubs, the
Court concluded that compelling RI to allow its clubs to admit women would not
"affect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their

82. See Marshall, supranote 57, at 77 (explaining that the Roberts Court held that
when a right to discriminate is recognized, "the limits of that right will depend on the
strength of the countervailing state interests").
83. See Devins, supra note 57, at 915-17 (noting that had the Court applied a
traditional strict scrutiny analysis, it would have discussed whether the Minnesota law
was the least restrictive means of achieving the state's objectives). Professor Mari
Matsuda, among others, would subject even laws that directly regulate "racist" speech
to a balancing test. See Mari Matsuda, PublicResponse to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
84. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
85. Id.
at 638-40.
86. Id.
at 640.
87. 481 U.S. 537 (1987). For commentary, see, for example, Marie A. Failinger,
Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates: A CritiqueofHannahArendt's View
ofthe Supreme Court's Dilemma, 49 U.Prrr. L. REV. 143 (1987); Aviam Soifer, Toward
a GeneralizedNotion of the Right to Form orJoin an Association:An Essayfor Tom
Emerson, 38 CASE NV. RES. L. REV. 641 (1988); Kimberly S. McGovern, Comment,

Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: PryingOpen the
Doors of the All-Male Club, 11 HARv. WOmEN'S LJ.117 (1988); Barbara A. Perry,
Comment, Like Fatherlike Daughter: The Admission of Women into FormerlyAll Male
"Private" Clubs: A Case Comment on Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV. 817 (1988-89).
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various purposes.""8 Indeed, the Court claimed that its ruling would help RI
achieve its stated goals of providing humanitarian service and encouraging high
ethical standards.89 The addition of women, the Court added, would also likely
promote RI's stated goal of ensuring that Rotary clubs represented a crosssection of their communities."
As in Roberts, the Court found that the law would have been constitutional
even if it did "work some slight infringement on Rotary members' right of
expressive association." 9' Public accommodations laws "plainly serv[e]
compelling state interests of the highest order" and "the State's compelling
interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of
leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods and services."'
In 1988, in the final case of what turned out to be a public accommodations
versus expressive association trilogy, the Supreme Court rejected a facial
challenge to a New York City law banning discrimination in clubs that are not
"distinctly private."'93 The Court noted, however, that "if a club seeks to exclude
individuals who do not share the views that the club's members wish to
promote," the law may not require association.9'
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST
As discussed in Part I, by the late 1980s the Supreme Court had signaled to
lower courts that they should try to evade conflicts between antidiscrimination
laws and the First Amendment. Failing that, courts were instructed to apply a
weak compelling interest test and uphold enforcement of the laws. As discussed
in Section A, below, the Court failed to explain why the government has a
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination sufficient to trump First
Amendment rights. Nor have lower courts or academic commentators provided

88. Duarte,481 U.S. at 548.
89. Id. at 548-49.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 549.
92. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984)).
93. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
94. Id. at 13. For commentary, see William Buss, Discriminationby PrivateClubs,
67 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 817 (1989); Marian L. Zobler, W'hen Is a Private Club Not a
Private Club: The Scope of the Rights of Private Clubs After New York State Club
Association v. City of New York, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 327, 344-45 (1989); Paula J.
Finlay, Note, Prying Open the ClubhouseDoor: Defining the "DistinctlyPrivate" Club
After New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 371,
375-76 (1990); Nancy G. Komblum, Comment, Redefining the Private Club: New York
State Club Associations, Inc. v. City of New York, 36 WASH U. J.URB. & CONTEMP. L.
249, 250 (1989); Julie A. Moegenburg, Comment, Freedom of Association and the
PrivateClub: The Installationof a "Threshold" Test to Legitimize PrivateClub Status
in the PublicEye, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 403, 404 (1989).
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any persuasive justification for privileging antidiscrimination laws over the First
Amendment.
Section B of Part II discusses the threat the compelling interest test posed
to civil liberties. Lower courts consistently held that free exercise and expressive
association defenses to antidiscrimination laws were trumped by the
government's compelling interests. These precedents eventually seeped into
cases involving pure expression, with courts holding that even the basic right to
freedom of speech could not trump enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.
However, the Supreme Court's 1995 decision inHurleyv. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group ofBoston" suggested that the Court's romance with
the compelling interest test was waning.
A. The Unjustified,and Unjustifiable, CompellingInterest Test
The fundamental problem with applying any version of the compelling
interest test when antidiscrimination laws conflict with the First
Amendment-much less the toothless version applied by the Supreme Court-is
that the government does not have even a constitutionally legitimate interest in
eradicating discriminatory attitudes, beliefs, expressions, or associations, or in
eradicating associations formed for the purpose of propagating discriminatory
attitudes, beliefs, expressions, or associations.' The very purpose of the free
speech protections of the First Amendment is to prevent the government from
quashing the expression or promotion of certain ideas.'
Several courts and commentators have attempted to explain why the
government has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination sufficient to
overcome First Amendment rights. This Section considers and rejects these
explanations.
1. The Argument from Congressional Intent
The first few judicial attempts to justify application of the compelling
interest test to antidiscrimination laws occurred in cases involving infringement
of the Free Exercise Clause. Courts argued that Congress intended that Title VII
eradicate discrimination. According to the Fifth Circuit, "Congress manifested
that interest in the enactment of Title VII and the other sections of the Civil

95. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
96. The Author thanks Bryan Wildenthal for this point.
97. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992)
(concluding that the First Amendment protects hate speech, whether aimed at minorities
or majorities); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ('lf there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
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Rights Act of 1964."98 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit claimed that "[b]y enacting
Title VII, Congress clearly targeted the elimination of all forms of discrimination
as a 'highest priority. ' 99
There are two problems with such reasoning. First, Congress did not
manifest an interest in eradicating discrimination by passing the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, although it did manifest an attempt to limit discrimination. 1' ° In
contrast with the goal of eliminating discrimination, the goal of limiting
discrimination is perfectly consistent with enjoining the enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws in the relatively rare instances in which the laws conflict
with the First Amendment. Second, and more important, Congress does not
have the power to limit the scope of a constitutional right by manifesting an
interest in doing so.' °' If the Congress-has-manifested-an-interest rationale was
followed in other cases, the Court would never overturn congressional statutes
on First Amendment grounds (flag-burning comes to mind!).
2. The Bob Jones Argument
In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court argued that the government's compelling
interest in eliminating racial discrimination in education manifested itself in
"myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders, as well as every
pronouncement of this Court attesting a firm national policy to prohibit racial
discrimination in public education."'0 2 The Court did not explain why acts of
Congress and the Executive branch, along with judicial opinions prohibiting
discrimination in public education, as the Constitution requires, raised the
government's interest in eradicating discrimination at a private university to a
status sufficient to overcome enumerated constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, Bob Jones was not a particularly radical opinion. First, it
involved free exercise. As noted previously,0 courts rarely applied a true strict

98. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980).
99. EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982).
100. Title VII, for example, is a civil (as opposed to criminal) statute; only applies
to employers with more than fifteen employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994);
contains damage caps and limitations, see 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (1994); requires
EEOC approval before filing suit, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994); and contains a
religious exemption, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1994). These features of the statute are
consistent with an interest in limiting discrimination, but just as certainly conflict with
a purported intent to eradicatediscrimination at the expense of all other values.
In fairness to the Fifth Circuit, several years earlier the Supreme Court incorrectly
asserted that "eradicating discrimination" was a "central statutory purpose" of Title VII.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
101. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., No. 99-4081, 2001 WL 123852 (3d
Cir. Feb. 14, 2001) (Rendell, J., concurring).
102. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983).
103. See supranotes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny test in free exercise cases, even if they purported to do so under
Sherbert. Second, the case involved discrimination against African-Americans.
The Warren and Burger Courts often stretched constitutional doctrines when
necessary to counteract the history of discrimination against AfricanAmericans."° Third, Bob Jones held only that the government had a compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination in education, where state and local
governments had been pervasively involved in discrimination." And, fourth,
because the IRS had to make an affirmative decision on whether granting a
discriminatory university a tax exemption was against public policy, the case
involved state action in a way that most cases involving discrimination by
private actors do not.
Moreover, as Freed and Polsby point out, there was reason to question the
sincerity of the university's claimed religious rationale for banning interracial
dating. Until federal enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, the university had
banned African-American students entirely. The ban on interracial dating may
well have been a subterfuge to discourage African-Americans from attending
while hiding behind a free exercise defense. The only way the Court could have
determined the truth would have been to examine in detail the university's
religious beliefs, a task courts are loath to do, partly because of Establishment
Clause concerns. The path of least resistance was to do what the Court did and
simply find that the claimed free exercise right was not sufficient to overcome
the government's interest in eradicating discrimination.
Perhaps not
surprisingly, after receiving withering public criticism following George W.
Bush's visit to the university in March 2000, the university abandoned its
"sincere religious belief' and lifted its ban on interracial dating.'
3. The Roberts Argument(s)
Roberts eviscerated the apparent limits of Bob Jones. Roberts involved
freedom of expressive association, not free exercise of religion; the parties who
faced discrimination in Roberts were women, not African-Americans; Roberts
involved discrimination that was perfectly legal under federal law; and Roberts
did not in any way, shape, or form involve state action.
Not surprisingly, Roberts' justification for stating that the government had
a compelling interest in eliminating the discrimination at issue was far weaker

104. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claibome Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (using novel
First Amendment theory to overturn a damage award against boycott organizer who
threatened violence based on novel First Amendment theory); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (expanding First Amendment protection of reporters to
prevent libel suits in the South against reporters and newspapers covering the Civil
Rights Movement); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (overturning trespass
convictions of civil rights protestors on novel state action grounds).
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 46, at 4, 21, 27.
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than Bob Jones' already questionable reasoning. Justice Brennan justified his
opinion in Roberts by noting the Minnesota Supreme Court's finding that
Minnesota had a "strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination."'"
Bizarrely, a federal constitutional right was overridden by a single state's
claimed interest in forcing an organization to admit women as members.' And,
in contrast to Bob Jones, where the compelling interest was only in eradicating
discrimination in education against African-Americans, suddenly the
government had an interest in eliminating discrimination against, it seems, any
group that the government cared to protect.
Another possible justification for the compelling interest analysis in Roberts
is Justice Brennan's analogy of discriminatory acts to crimes and torts.
According to Brennan, the malum in se aspects of invidious discrimination
means that discriminatory expressive acts are subject to a balancing test, rather
than being entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection.

107. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
108. For criticism of such reasoning, see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission, 165 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Nor, would it seem, can a single state's
law evince-under any standard-a compelling government interest for federal
constitutional purposes."), rev'd on othergrounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). For
support of such reasoning, see Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law
Centerv. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 46 (1987) (Newman, J., concurring) ("an
interest need not be national in scope to be compelling").
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Beyond the philosophical and historical problems this argument entails,'"
Justice Brennan seemed to open a huge loophole in First Amendment law.
Brennan seemed to suggest that the government automatically has a compelling
interest in eradicating all extant categories of discrimination contained in any
federal or state law. 10 Moreover, because Brennan did not examine the facts of

109. The American constitutional system, as reflected in the Declaration of
Independence, the body of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights (especially the Ninth
Amendment), and the Civil War Amendments, rests on the idea that the purpose of
government is to secure the natural rights of the citizenry-life, liberty, and property.
Common law rights, such as the rights to make and enforce contracts, to hold and
alienate property, and to seek redress for injury to person and property in the tort system,
are consistent with the Framers' vision and were either undisturbed or strengthened by
various constitutional provisions. By contrast, welfare rights, including the right to be
free from private discrimination, were not part of the original constitutional design and
are not to be found anywhere in the Constitution or its Amendments. The legislature can
grant a "positive" right to be free from private discrimination, but such a right cannot
trump the liberties granted by the Constitution absent constitutional amendment. Thus,
the proper role of the compelling interest test is to permit the suspension of enforcement
of a constitutional right only when necessary to deal with an imminent threat to life, limb,
and property. See generally Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)
(noting that the Constitution is "a charter of negative liberties").
Putting constitutional theory and history aside, advocates of the Roberts version of
the compelling interest test would argue that it is not self-evident that threats to life, limb,
and property are more important than threats to livelihood and dignity. However, life,
limb, and property are reasonably well defined terms, whereas courts could interpret
"dignity" and "individuality" so broadly that the compelling interest exception would
swallow the First Amendment. Moreover, the alleged rights to dignity and individuality
works both ways---the government threatens the dignity and individuality of members
of private social groups when it compels them to associate with others. Also, the basic
security and prosperity of members of society are dependent on the protection of life,
limb, and property. Admittedly, the basic right to pursue a livelihood is important as
well, but under the United States Constitution that right is protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment. The government can grant additional statutory protections, but
constitutional boundaries ensure that in doing so the government does not invade other
crucial rights, such as those protected by the First Amendment. In any event, no one in
the foundational Bob Jones or Roberts cases claimed that the livelihoods of the
beneficiaries of the laws in question were in danger.
110. Dale's attorneys made this argument. See Respondents' Brief at 36, Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (No. 99-699). See generally Brief of
Amici Curiae for the Cities of Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Portland, San
Francisco, and Tucson, Boy Scouts of Arm. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000) (No. 99-699)
(discussing various groups protected by cities' antidiscrimination laws, and arguing that
the Court should find that the cities have a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against all of these groups sufficient to exempt the laws from First
Amendment strictures).
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Roberts with any care,"'
arguably this compelling interest would exist in all
2
possible instances."
Yet by contrast to trespass and other torts and crimes that may have
expressive aspects, but are nevertheless not entitled to constitutional protection,
antidiscrimination law has no clear definitional boundaries. The concept of
antidiscrimination is almost infinitely malleable. Almost any economic
behavior, and much other behavior, can be defined as discrimination. Because
of the rent-seeking"3 advantages of defining oneself as the victim of
discrimination, the definition of discrimination has been expanding exponentially
in the United States to include, for example, the use of a standardized test that
leads to unequal results among different groups,"' and the refusal to subsidize
employees who create special additional expenses in the workplace."' Allowing

111. Justice Brennan argued that "discrimination based on archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to
labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities"
and "deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
participation in political economic and cultural life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees,

468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984). Brennan also suggested that in Roberts women were deprived
of access to "various commercial programs and benefits offered to members." Id. at 626.
A close review of the facts of Roberts, however, suggests that Minnesota's interest in
forcing the Jaycees to admit women as members was not especially compelling. See
Bemstein, supranote 22, at 162-65. Nor did Brennan specifically explain why access
to "various commercial programs and benefits" is so important that it trumps First
Amendment rights.
112. See Respondents' Brief at 36, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446
(2000) (No. 99-699).
113. Rent-seeking is the attempt to capture resources through coerced
redistribution via government, rather than through voluntary market transfers. Many
scholars implicitly treat antidiscrimination law as ifits underlying moral basis means that
it is exempt from ordinary political forces. For example, in AntidiscriminationLaw and
Social Equality,Andrew Koppelman suggests that because the current law of workplace
harassment infringes severely on workers' First Amendment rights, it should be
discarded as soon as it has served its purpose of opening up opportunities for previously
excluded minorities and women. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
AND SOCIAL EQUALrrY 254 (1996). Koppelman never explains how Congress will reach
a consensus that this goal has been achieved, nor does he explain how once Congress
reaches such a consensus it will override the lobbying power of the interest groups that
will inevitably coalesce to defend workplace harassment doctrine.
114. The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights has drafted a guide that
establishes a rebuttable presumption that "the use of any educational test which has a
significant disparate impact on members of any particular race, national origin, or sex is
discriminatory," and hence illegal. John Leo, The Feds Strike Back, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 31, 1999, at 16.
115. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
require employers to subsidize religious and disabled employees, respectively. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified
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the government to ignore the First Amendment in regulating any behavior the
government chooses to define as discrimination would gradually destroy the
First Amendment.
Meanwhile, since Roberts states and cities have added many new protected
categories to public accommodations and other antidiscrimination laws. The
District of Columbia Human Rights Act, for example, prohibits discrimination
on the basis of an individual's "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities,
physical handicap, matriculation, or political affiliation."" 6 Michigan prohibits
discrimination on the basis of obesity." 7 The University of Nebraska bans
discrimination on the basis of hair length."' Several cities ban discrimination
based on parental status." 9 Minnesota outlaws discrimination in public
accommodations against members of motorcycle gangs.'

as amended at 42 U.S.C § 2000e(j) (1994)) ("The term 'religion' includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business."); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994); 34
C.F.R. § 104.12(b)(2) (1999). An employer can only avoid liability for not making (and
paying for) a "reasonable accommodation" if this accommodation would cause the
employer "undue hardship," a condition defined rather stringently in 42 U.S.C. §
12111(10)(B) (1994). The requirement that religious and disabled employees be
accommodated if it does not create an "undue hardship" means that enduring some
hardship is required. In economic terms, the hardship constitutes a subsidy to the
employee. Refusal to incur the costs involved in this subsidy is considered illegal
"discrimination."
A similar expansion of antidiscrimination concepts has been occurring in other
countries as well. For example, the New Zealand Human Rights Commission has
determined that refusing service to a customer whose account will be on credit because
she is unemployed, has no credit card, earns less than $10,000 a year, and does not own
a home is illegal discrimination on the grounds of employment status. N. v. E.,
Complaints Division W31/99 (N.Z. Human Rights Comm'n Oct. 26, 1999), availableat
http:J/www.hrc.co.iziorg/legal/teritojuly0O.htnL
116. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1992).
117. See MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 37.2102 (West 1985).
118. See Josh Knaub, Lm Faculty Puts Hair-Length Dilemma to Rest, DAILY
NEBRASKAN ONLINE ED. (Apr. 21, 1999), at http//vwv.dailyneb.com/vnewstdisplay.v/

ART/1999/04121/371d43eb8?in-archive= (last visited Feb. 23,2001).
119. BOSTON, MASS., CODE § 12-9.7 (2000); CHICAGO, ILL, MUNIC. CODE §
2-160-070 (2000).
120. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.12, subd. 2(a) (West 2000) ("A place of public
accommodation may not restrict access, admission, or usage to a person solely because
the person operates a motorcycle or is wearing clothing that displays the name of an
organization or association."); cf.Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C. Flanagans, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 552 (Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that sports bar could deny admission to motorcycle
club members who refused to remove their colors).
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Does "eradicating discrimination" against members of each of these
categories, along with members of any other categories legislators come up with,
constitute a compelling interest sufficient to overcome the right to expressive
association under Roberts? Such an understanding of Roberts would eviscerate
almost completely the right of expressive association.' Nevertheless, several
courts have held that prevention of discrimination against unmarried
heterosexual couples-hardly an oppressed group in American society-in the
housing market is a compelling interest, even when the government itself
discriminates against unmarried couples in other contexts."
4. The Reconstruction Amendments Argument
Another argument that could be used to support application of the
compelling interest test has been provided by academics. Several scholars have
argued that the Reconstruction Amendments overrule constitutional limits on the
government's power to protect African-Americans and perhaps other groups
from private discrimination." These scholars argue that the overarching historic

121. See Petitioners' Reply Brief at 18, Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 120S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (No. 99-699) ('That would be the end of all freedom of association.").
122. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743 (111. App. Ct.) (holding that the
government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against unmarried couples
overcame the landlord's free exercise defense), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997);
McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998) (holding under Michigan
constitution that requiring landlords to rent to unmarried couples does not violate free
exercise right because the compelling interest test was satisfied), vacated, 593 N.W.2d
545 (Mich. 1999); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (three
dissenters arguing that eliminating any type of invidious discrimination is a compelling
government interest that overcomes free exercise rights). For criticism, see Swanner,
513 U.S. at 979 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated:
If, despite affirmative discrimination by Alaska on the basis of martial status
and a complete absence of any national policy against such discrimination, the
State's asserted interest in this case is allowed to qualify as a "compelling"
interest-that is, a 'paramount' interest, an interest 'of the highest
order'--then I am at a loss to know what asserted governmental interests are
not compelling. The decision of the Alaska Supreme Court drains the word
compelling of any meaning and seriously undermines ... protection for
exercise of religion....
Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
123. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of The MissingAmendments: R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 106 HARV L. REV. 124 (1992) (arguing that the Reconstruction
Amendments grant a positive right to be free from private discrimination). For a
persuasive rebuttal of Amar's contentions, see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A
Penumbra Too Far,106 HARV. L. REV. 1639 (1993). See also Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual
Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 519
(1995); David B. Oppenheimer, Workplace Harassmentand the Amendment: A Reply
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purpose of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments was to undo
the status of African-Americans as a subordinated caste. 24 Given that the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments do not single out racial discrimination,
the argument continues, the Reconstruction Amendments are best understood as
creating a governmental obligation to eliminate caste-like patterns of group
subordination in American society, whether these patterns arise from
governmental or private sources. 25 This obligation in turn can supercede
protections provided by the Bill of Rights in appropriate circumstances.
In fact, however, the Fourteenth Amendment contains a clear state action
limitation, and, moreover, even advocates of the Amendments consistently
distinguished between civil rights, which were protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and social rights, such as the right to be free from private
discrimination, which were not." But even if one accepts the broad anti-caste
interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Amendments merely
support a compelling interest in limiting discrimination to ensure that no private
caste system or caste-like system is established. Preventing the creation or
continuation of a caste is a far cry from "eradicating discrimination," the
compelling interest identified in Roberts. A fair amount of discrimination
against a group can exist in the absence of a caste or caste-like system.
In any event, Roberts did not hold that eliminating discrimination is a
compelling interest only when the victims suffer from caste-like restrictions. If
the Court had done so, one could argue about the propriety of its decision, and
how one should decide which groups get special victim status as recompense for
"group subordination." For example, the Court might have held that the
government can only have a compelling interest in protecting a group from
private discrimination if that group has been deemed a suspect class for equal
protection purposes, a category that currently excludes women.

to Professor Volokh, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321,323 (1996); Alexander Tsesis,
The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Historical
Perspectiveon the Power ofHate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARAL. REv. 729 (2000).
124. See supranote 123.
125. Communications with Professor Leslie Goldstein helped the Author frame this
point See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410
(1994).
126. See, eg., HAROLD M. HYMAN &NWILLMM. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICEUNDER
LAW 299-300, 395-97 (1982); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1014-23 (1995). Modem scholars

nevertheless argue that the Fourteenth Amendment should be used to privilege social
rights over First Amendment rights.
As Professor Eugene Volokh has explained, some scholars disclaim reliance on the
Reconstruction Amendments as such, and instead argue that First Amendment rights
should be subordinated to antidiscrimination claims because the "constitutional value"
of equality is in tension with First Amendment "values." Volokh persuasively rebuts this
argument in Freedom of Speech and the ConstitutionalTension Method, 3 U. CHI.
ROUNDTABLE 223 (1996).
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The Court would also have had to delineate exactly which constitutional
rights are trumped by the Reconstruction Amendments. Contrary to current
constitutional doctrine' 27 the Reconstruction Amendments argument detailed
above would potentially allow the government to suppress hate speech, or, for
that matter, any speech that arguably contributed to a caste-like system.'

5. The Public Accommodations Argument
A final possible defense of the compelling interest test is limited to cases
involving public accommodations laws. The claim is that even if the
government does not have a compelling interest that rises to constitutional status
in eliminating all discrimination, it does have such an interest in eliminating
discrimination in public accommodations. The right to use a public
accommodation, after all, has a long-standing common law pedigree. Failure to
open a public accommodation to the public at large can be analogized to a

traditional common law tort, such as fraud, that is not generally entitled to First
Amendment protection. This argument has the practical advantage of limiting
the Roberts line of cases to public accommodations laws.
The specific facts of Roberts create problems for this line of reasoning,
however. First, the common law right was limited in scope and had its origins
in preventing the abuse of monopoly power, not antidiscrimination concerns as
such."2 Second, even under an expansive view of the common law rule, no one
denied women the right to use the Jaycees' accommodations in any literal
sense-women were allowed to participate in Jaycees activities, but could not
become full members of the organization and vote. 3 ' If Minnesota's

127. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that laws
targeting hate speech are unconstitutional).
128. Moreover, constitutional rights ranging from the prohibition on ex post facto
rules to the criminal procedure rules of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments would
be vulnerable as well.
129. At common law, innkeepers and others who "made profession of a public
employment" were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer.
See Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464-1465 (K.B. 1701) (Holt, C.J.). As a
nineteenth century English judge put it, the rule was that "[tjhe innkeeper is not to select
his guests[;] [h]e has no right to say to one, you shall come into my inn, and to another
you shall not,as every one coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right
to be received and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants." Rex v.
Ivens, 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (N.P. 1835). However, the rule seems to have its origins not
in a modem antidiscrimination principle, but in the monopoly that innkeepers often had
when travel was by horse and buggy and only one inn might present itself during a day's
journey. If that inn refused a customer, the customer would have nowhere to eat and
sleep that evening.
130. Indeed, over the last few decades states and localities have expanded the
definition of public accommodations in their antidiscrimination statutes far beyond the
common law rules. For example, in a case alleging that eating clubs used by Princeton
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constitutional argument in Roberts had been based on traditional common law
prerogatives, the Court would properly have held that membership and voting
rights in an organization are not part of the use of a public accommodation in a
traditional common law sense, and the Jaycees was therefore entitled to First
Amendment protection if its right to expressive association was infiinged upon.
B. Roberts and the Threat to the Civil Liberties
As discussed below, courts consistently applied the compelling interest test
as delineated in Roberts in subsequent litigation when conflicts arose between
laws banning discrimination and the First Amendment. The compelling interest
test threatened to render free exercise and expressive association rights
ineffectual when they conflicted with the enforcement of antidiscrimination
laws, and also began to threaten the foundational right of freedom of speech.
However, the 1995 case of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group ofBoston suggested that the Supreme Court had reconsidered its reliance
on an impotent compelling interest test when antidiscrimination laws threatened
the First Amendment. Instead of following Roberts and Duarte and applying
that test to a conflict between a public accommodations law and the right of
expressive association, the Court applied traditional robust First Amendment
scrutiny, and unanimously declared the law to be unconstitutional because it
infringed on First Amendment rights.
1. The Compelling Interest Test Overwhelms the First Amendment
After Bob Jones and Roberts, lower courts consistently found that the
government had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination sufficient to
overcome any infringement of antidiscrimination laws on the right of free
exercise of religion.' Because free exercise defenses to generally-applicable

University students violated New Jersey's public accommodations law, the state supreme
court admitted that the clubs were formally private. Nevertheless, the court found that
the "Gestalt" of the clubs' relationship to Princeton made them public and therefore
subject to the state's public accommodations law. See Frank v. Ivy Club, 576 A.2d 241,
256-57 (N.J. 1990).
131. In addition to the cases discussed below, see Gay Rights Coalition of
Georgetown University Law Centerv. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987)
(ruling that Catholic university could be compelled to give the same benefits to gay
student organizations that it offered to other student groups because of government's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against gays); McLeod v. Providence
Christian School, 408 N.W.2d 146, 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that the
government's interest in eradicating employment discrimination is sufficiently
compelling to allow government to force school to retain teacher who sought, in violation
of church teachings, to work while raising young children). But see Dayton Christian
Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd on ripeness
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laws were rarely looked on favorably-even before Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith----this result was not especially
remarkable.
More disquieting was that after Roberts most courts became dismissive of
expressive association defenses to antidiscrimination laws.' The California
Supreme Court, for example, held that the First Amendment posed no barrier to
forcing a Boys' Club to accept girls' because the public accommodations law
in question intruded "no further, and for no less compelling purpose, than was
the case in Roberts."'35 The Connecticut Supreme Court stated in dicta that the
Boy Scouts of America's argument that it had a constitutional right to exclude
women from serving as scoutmasters had "little merit" in light of Roberts and
36 Not all of these cases clearly implicated
Duarte.1
expressive association, as
opposed to more general freedom of association claims. However, courts
cavalierly suggested that even valid expressive association defenses must always
yield to the government's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination. 37
It was only a matter of time before the expressive association precedents
began filtering into "pure expression" cases. Several courts stated that the

grounds,417 U.S. 619 (1986) (government's interest in eradicating discrimination in
private Christian schools not sufficiently compelling to allow state to compel school to
retain teacher who complained of sex discrimination after her contract was not renewed
because of her pregnancy).

132. 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
133. But see Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of Thurmont,
700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that the KKK had a constitutional right to
exclude African-Americans from its parade; distinguishing Roberts primarily by relying
on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion).
134. See Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212, 220-21 (Cal.

1985).
135. Id. at 221. The court then proceeded to deny the club's claims under the
California Constitution, even though the state constitution "affords greater privacy,
expressive, and associational rights in some cases than its federal counterpart." Id.; cf
Warfield v. Peninsula Golf& Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 778-79 (Cal. 1995) (holding
that California's public accommodations law did not interfere with a country club's right
of expressive association, and therefore there was no reason to apply the compelling
interest test).
136. Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights
& Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 356 n.5 (Conn. 1987).

137. See id.; see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1280 (7th Cir.
1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a holding that a state public
accommodations law does not apply to the Boy Scouts as a matter of statutory
interpretation, and arguing that the compelling interest test justifies applying the law to
the Scouts). Of course, as discussed previously, Roberts itself suggested as much. See
supratext following note 108.
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government has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination sufficient to
override the First Amendment and permit the direct regulation of speech.""
Conflict between antidiscrimination and freedom of speech arose in the
context of "hostile environment" litigation 3 Not only did courts punish speech
that was protected in other contexts," 0 but several courts also granted broad
injunctions against potentially discriminatory workplace speech without apparent
concern that these injunctions constituted prior restraints, the most disfivored
form of speech restrictions.'

138. One court stated that the applicable standard when an antidiscrimination law
infringes on free speech is the even weaker "substantial interest" test. See Presbytery of
New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 902 F. Supp. 492, 517
(D.N.J. 1995).
139. For academic commentary on the relationship between hostile environment
law and the First Amendment, see J.M. Balkin, FreeSpeech andHostileEnvironments,
99 COLurM. L. REv. 2295 (1999); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-EnvironmentHarassmentandthe FirstAmendment, 52 OHIo ST. LJ. 481,539
(1991); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom ofExpression in the Workplace and the Problem

of DiscriminatoryHarassment,75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Sexual Harassment,ContentNeutrality,andthe FirstAmendment Dog That Didn'tBark,
1994 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassmentandthe FirstAmendment: No Collision in Sight, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual
Harassmentand Upholding The FirstAmendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 VIUL. L.
REV. 757 (1992); Eugene Volokh, ThinldngAheadAboutFreedom ofSpeech andHostile
Work EnvironmentHarassment,17 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 305 (1996); Eugene
Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L. REV.
1791, 1814-15 (1992).

140. E.g., Bowman v. Heller, No. 90-3269, 1993 WL 761159, at *8 (Mass. Super.
Ct. July 9, 1993) (finding liability based on an obnoxious satire involving the pasting a
picture of a political opponent's head to a picture of a nude woman's body), rev'd on
othergrounds, 651 N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1995); cf.J. EDWARD PAWLICK, FREEDOM WILL
CONQUER RAcISM AND SExIsM 221-23 (1988) (describing a case in which Boston
University was held liable for sex discrimination against a professor after the trial court
admitted as evidence of discriminatory attitudes a speech by the president of the
university to an outside audience suggesting that young children are better offwhen their
mothers do not work outside the home); Pakizegi v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 831 F.
Supp. 901,908-09 (D.Mass. 1993) (concluding that hanging a picture of the Ayatollah
Khomeini and a burning American flag in one's cubicle creates a hostile environment
based on national origin) (dictum).
141. E.g., Turner v. Barr, 806 F. Supp. 1025, 1029 (D.D.C. 1992) (ordering an
employer and its employees to "refiain from any racial, religious, ethnic, or other remarks
or slurs contrary to their fellow employees' religious belief&"); Harris v. Int'l Paper Co.,
765 F. Supp. 1509, 1527 (D. Me. 1991) (emphasis omitted) (requiring employer and
employees to "cease and desist from... racial harassment in the workplace including,
but not limited to, any and all offensive conduct and speech implicating considerations
of race"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
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The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of punishing
workplace speech, but several courts have held that workplace speech is not
protected if it contributes to a "hostile environment." The key case to date is
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,Inc.,42 in which a female shipyard worker

successfully prosecuted a hostile environment claim against her employer. 43
Because the claim was based in part on offensive speech, including speech not
directed at the plaintiff but offensive to her, the defendant claimed that the
court's decision violated its right to freedom of speech.'" Moreover, the
defendant objected to the court's extremely broad injunction
banning speech that
45
seemed clearly to be protected by the First Amendment.
In the course of rejecting the company's First Amendment defense, the
court relied on several specious arguments in denying that hostile environment
law ever implicates the First Amendment." Apart from those arguments, the
Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (banning "derogatory
bulletins, cartoons, and other written material" and "any racial, ethnic, or religious slurs
whether in the form of 'jokes,' 'jests,' or otherwise"); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 859 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 120. S. Ct. 2029 (2000) (prohibiting
"racial epithets").
142. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
143. Id. at 1491.
144. Id. at 1535.
145. The court specifically banned the following types of speech at the company:
(1)displaying pictures, posters, calendars, graffiti, objects, promotional
materials, reading materials, or other materials that are sexually suggestive,
sexually demeaning, or pornographic, or bringing into the . . . work

environment or possessing any such material to read, display or view at work.
A picture will be presumed to be sexually suggestive if it depicts a
person of either sex who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited
to or ordinarily accepted for the accomplishment of routine work in and
around the shipyard and who is posed for the obvious purpose of displaying
or drawing attention to private portions of his or her body.
(2) reading or otherwise publicizing in the work environment materials
that are in any way sexually revealing, sexually suggestive, sexually
demeaning or pornographic.
Id. at 1542.
This injunction would, for example, bar the reading of a Danielle Steele novel on
lunch break. See generally Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating
Workplace Harassmentand the FirstAmendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.

701, 722 (1995) (criticizing the court's injunction as overbroad).
146. Briefly, the court found that: (1) the company was not expressing itself
through the "sexually oriented pictures or the verbal harassment by its employees"; (2)
the pictures and verbal harassment were not protected speech but "discriminatory conduct
in the form of a hostile work environment"; (3)the regulation of verbal harassment was
merely a time, place, and manner regulation of speech; and (4) female workers were a
captive audience. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535-36. For a sound rebuttal of these
arguments, see Volokh, supra note 39, at 1498-1501.
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court claimed that even if the First Amendment protects workplace speech in
such contexts, the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
exempts hostile environment law from this protection. 47 The court wrote:
[1]f the speech at issue is treated as fully protected, and the Court must
balance the governmental interest in cleansing the workplace of
impediments to the equality of women, the latter is a compelling
interest that permits the regulation of the former and the regulation is
narrowly drawn to serve this interest. Other first amendment rights,
such as the freedom of association and the free exercise of religion,
have bowed to narrowly tailored remedies designed to advance the
compelling governmental interest in eradicating employment
discrimination. 4 s
Robinson has been extremely influential. Several courts have cited its First
Amendment holding favorably, 49 and no case has yet held directly that the First
Amendment prohibits workplace speech from being the basis of Title VII
liability if that speech would be protected in other contexts. 5

147. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1536.

148. Idat 1535 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537,548-49 (1987); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280-81 (9th
Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1980). The court
previously cited Roberts for the proposition that eliminating discrimination against
women is a "compelling interest." 1d.
149. For cases following Robinson, see Baty v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 987 (D. Kan. 1997), aff'd, 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Robinson for
support of the proposition that the First Amendment does not preclude a finding of
liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment); Berman v. Washington Times
Corp., No. 92-2738(VRB), 1994 WL 750274, at *5 n.4 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1994)
("Although the Defendant has claimed that the First Amendment shields such behavior
from liability, this Court finds itself in accord with those authorities that have found that
the Constitution does not bar government regulations of such gender-based harassment
in the workplace."); Jensonv. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993);
Bowman v. Heller,No. 90-3269, 1993 WIL 761159, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 9, 1993),
rev'd on other grounds, 651 N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1995); see also Aguilar v. Avis Rent A
Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2029 (2000)
(utilizing Roberts' analogy of discrimination to violence); id. at 877 (Werdergar, J.,
concurring) (upholding restrictions on speech in the workplace despite constitutional
constraints because of California's compelling interest in eliminating racial
discrimination in the workplace). For recent commentary, see Note, Constitutional
Law-Free Speech Clause-CaliforniaSupreme Court Upholds Injunction Against
HarassingSpeech in the Worplace-Aguilarv. Avis Rent a Car System, 113 HARV. L.

REv. 2116 (2000).
150. However, four Supreme Court Justices have suggested that hostile
environment law may violate the First Amendment. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 665, 682 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist,
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2. Hurley to the Rescue
Just when it seemed that American law was on the verge of irrevocably
privileging antidiscrimination claims over First Amendment rights, the Supreme
Court decided Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston.'5' For the first time, when presented with a general antidiscrimination
law that conflicted with the First Amendment, the Court held the law was
unconstitutional as applied. The Court also implicitly disclaimed reliance on the
compelling interest test in cases involving such conflicts.
In Hurley, Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group ("GLIB"), a
gay rights organization, claimed that the organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's Day
Parade were obligated under a Massachusetts public accommodations law to
permit GLIB's members to march under GLIB's banner.'52 The parade
organizers responded that they had a First Amendment right to exclude a group
that sought to convey a message (in this case, they claimed, a "sexual message")
the organizers did not wish to convey.'53
The trial court held that the parade was a public accommodation under
Massachusetts law, and that the organizers were required to permit GLIB to
march in it.'" The court found it "impossible to discern any specific expressive
purpose entitling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment ....The
Parade is not an exercise of their constitutionally protected right of expressive
association."' 55 The court also found that any infringement on the organizers'
right to expressive association was only "incidental," and that any such

C.J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has noted in dictum that
hostile environment law may conflict with the First Amendment. In DeAngelis v. El
Paso MunicipalPolice Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1995), the court
cited Robinson critics Volokh and Browne, and suggested that "[w]here pure expression
is involved, Title VII steers into the territory of the First Amendment." See also Aguilar,
980 P.2d at 882 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that an injunction barring offensive
workplace speech violated the First Amendment); id. at 891 (Brown, J., dissenting)
(arguing that like other offensive speech, offensive workplace speech must be tolerated
under the First Amendment). For a comprehensive review of cases that have mentioned
the First Amendment defense to hostile environment law, see Eugene Volokh, What
Courts Have Said About Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, at
http'/www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/harass/COURTS.HTM#T6 (last visited Nov. 27,
2000).
151. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

152. Id. at 561. For background, see Larry W. Yackle, ParadingOurselves:
Freedom of Speech at the Feast of St. Patrick,73 B.U. L. REV. 791 (1993).
153. See Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston,
No. 9-21518, 1993 WL 818674, at *2 n.5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993), affd, 636
N.E.2d 1293 (Mass. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
154. Id. at *14.
155. Id. at* 13-14.
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infringement was justified by the government's interest in eradicating
discrimination against homosexuals. 56 Under Roberts, the organizers' First
Amendment argument failed. On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court agreed that the organizers had no viable free speech or expressive
association claim."
Meanwhile, a federal district court issued a declaratory judgment holding
that the organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade had a constitutional right
to exclude GLIB from the 1995 parade."5 8 The court concluded that unlike the
scenarios in Roberts andDuarte,the public accommodations statute in question
significantly burdened the organizers' right to associate for expressive
purposes. 59 The court then held that even if under the Roberts test the state had
a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against gays, it could not rule
in GLIB's favor because to do so "would risk seriously undermining the
protection provided by the First Amendment."" The court was apparently so
uncomfortable with Roberts that it defied Supreme Court precedent.
Before the declaratory judgment case was appealed, the original state
litigation reached the United States Supreme Court. The Court reversed the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion written by Justice David
Souter."' Souter acknowledged that public accommodations laws have a
venerable history, and "are well within the State's usual power to enact when a
legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target ofdiscrimination,
and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendments."'" Souter also noted that the Massachusetts law was typical of
public accommodations statutes, in that it did not "target speech or discriminate
on the basis of content."'"
However, the Court explained that the parade organizers did not exclude
gays from the parade, but rather excluded a group that had been formed for the
express purpose of marching under its own banner in the parade "in order to

156. Id. at* 14.
157. See Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston,
636 N.E.2d 1293, 1300 (Mass. 1994), rev'dsub nom. Hurley v. Irish-An. Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
158. See S.Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. Boston, 875 F. Supp. 891,920
(D.Mass. 1995); cf New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibemians v. Dinldns,
814 F. Supp. 358, 364-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that parade organizers had a free
speech right to ban a homosexual group from marching under its own banner, and, while
declining to reach the organizers' expressive association claim, noting that "[t]here may
well be substance to this argument").
159. Allied War, 875 F. Supp. at 915.
160. Id at 917.
161. See Hurley v. Irish-Am Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995).
162. . at 572.
163. Id.
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celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants
of Irish immigrants."' 64 "[O]nce the expressive character of both the parade and
the marching GLIB contingent is understood," Justice Souter wrote, "it becomes
apparent that the state courts' application of the statute had the effect of
declaring the sponsors' speech itself to be the public accommodation." 65 The
choice of the organizers not to propound a particular point of view "is presumed
to lie beyond the government's power to control.""' Souter stressed "the
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message."1 67
Justice Souter concluded by distinguishing Roberts and Duarte on the
grounds that those cases did not involve a "trespass on the organization's
message itself."' 6 Roberts and Duarte did not disturb the right of private
organizations to "exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with
a position taken by the [organization's] existing members."' 69 Souter did not
proceed to apply the compelling interest test as Roberts seemed to require,7 even
though the trial court had relied upon that test, as had GLIB in its brief. 1
The broader significance of Hurley was not immediately clear because the
Court did not state whether its holding relied on free speech rights or expressive
association rights. One possible interpretation of this lack of clarity was that the
Court declined to find a constitutionally-meaningful distinction between those
rights. If so, Hurley had significantly narrowed the scope of Roberts, which had
treated expressive association as a poor First Amendment stepsister by
subjecting it to the anemic compelling interest test. Another possible
interpretation was that Hurley was purely a free speech case, not an expressive
association case, and therefore left the Roberts line of expressive association
cases undisturbed.' 7 ' The former view was soon vindicated in Dale.
164. Id. at 570.
165. Id. at 573.
166. Id. at 573, 575.
167. Id. at 573.
168. Id. at 580.
169. Id. at 581.
170. See Respondent's Brief at 22, Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (No. 94-74g). See generallyWilliam N. Eskridge,
A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out ": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions ofLiberty
andEquality in American PublicLaw, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2458 (1997) ("[T]he queerest
feature of the opinion is the way the Court's governing precedent, Roberts, disappeared
into a legal closet."); Andrew R. Varcoe, The Boy Scouts and the FirstAmendment:
ConstitutionalLimits on the Reach ofAnti-DiscriminationLaw, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY

163, 203-06 (1999-2000) (noting Hurley's "cursory" treatment of Roberts and the
Court's "puzzling" failure to explicitly apply the compelling interest test).
171. The first relevant case decided after Hurley took the latter position. The Utah
Supreme Court wrote that "Hurley addressed only the right to control the content of a
parade's 'message' under the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech; it specifically
did not address the issue ofparticipationof protected groups in the parade." Elk's Lodge
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III. THE END OF THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST!?
As discussed below, the Supreme Court majority in Dale paid lip service
to Roberts, but actually applied Hurley's far more stringent standard. As in
Hurley, the compelling interest test played no role in Dale'smajority opinion.
The dissenters also declined to rely on the compelling interest test.

A. The State CourtDecisions
James Dale became a Cub Scout at the age of eight and remained in
scouting until he turned eighteen, achieving the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988."
In 1989, Dale applied for adult membership in the Boy Scouts of America
("BSA") and became an assistant scoutmaster.'
Meanwhile, Dale
acknowledged his homosexuality and became active in his university's gay and
lesbian advocacy organization. 4 In 1990, a newspaper printed an interview
with Dale about his advocacy on behalf of gay youth.' s Dale soon received a
letter from the local scouting council revoking his adult membership because the
BSA "specifically forbid[s] membership to homosexuals."' 76
In 1992, Dale filed a complaint in state court against the BSA alleging
violation of New Jersey's public accommodations statute.'" The trial court
found for the BSA, holding that forcing the BSA to employ Dale would violate
the BSA's First Amendment rights.
The New Jersey Court of Appeals reversed."' The court concluded that
the free speech rights of the BSA were not infringed.
The court pointed to
BSA rules and bylaws that state that the only requirements for BSA membership

No. 719 &No. 2021 v. Dep't ofAlcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Utah
1995). The court instead applied the Roberts compelling interest test, and found that an
Elk's Lodge could be required to admit women. Id By contrast, Justice Joyce Kennard
of the California Supreme Court opined that "[t]he breadth of the Hurley decision raises
grave doubts" about whether the BSA could be required to admit those who disagreed
with its views regarding homosexual conduct, including avowed homosexuals. Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 256 (Cal. 1998)
(Kennard, J., concurring).
172. The background facts are found in Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000).
173. Id. at 2449.
174. Id
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2450.
179. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998), aff'd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev d, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
180. Id at 288.
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are age, gender, and willingness to adhere to the Scout Law and Scout Oath.
The BSA had contended that the requirements in those documents that Scouts
be "morally straight" and "clean" precludes endorsement of homosexual
activity. 8 ' The court responded that because the BSA did not have an official
position on homosexuality until 1978, and because the position was very poorly
publicized, the BSA did not really try to convey a message about homosexual
activity.12 Moreover, the BSA did not expel individuals or organizations that
publicly opposed the BSA's policy on homosexuality, suggesting
that it was
83
homosexual status, not advocacy, that led to Dale's expulsion.
The court distinguished Hurley on the grounds that "both the parade and
GLIB's participation [in Hurley] were pure forms of speech."'" By contrast, the
BSA was claiming a right to expressive association, and, as in Roberts, any
infringement on the BSA's right to expressive association was justified by the
state's compelling interest in "eradicating discrimination."'8 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the appellate court's
decision." Like the lower court, the Supreme Court found that forcing the BSA
to employ Dale did not constitute "forced speech.""' Hurley was not controlling
because "Boy Scout leadership is not a form of 'pure speech' akin to a
parade."' 88
The court also determined that the BSA's ability to disseminate its message
was not significantly affected by the forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant
scoutmaster. 8 9 The court concluded that "even if Dale's membership 'works
some slight infringement on ... [the BSA's] members' right of expressive

association,' the 'infiingement is justified because it serves... [New Jersey's]

181. Id.
182. Id. at 289-90.
183. Id. at 290-91.
184. Id. at 293.
185. Id. A dissenting judge argued that Hurley should have controlled the outcome
of the case. Id. at 295. Hurley, the judge wrote, stood for the principle that leaders of
an organization have the right to control the message articulated by the organization.
"This principle," he continued, "is not changed merely because the altered message is
implicitly, but no less strongly, conveyed by example rather than by verbal articulation
or by signs." Id. (Landau, J., dissenting). The judge added that Roberts does not dictate
a contrary result because "nothing in Roberts prevents an organization from advocating
its view that a gay lifestyle is immoral and undesirable without requiring it to provide a
platform for competing advocacy, express or implicit." Id.
186. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct.
2446 (2000).
187. Id. at 1229.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1223.
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B. The Supreme CourtMajority Opinion
The BSA appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In a 5-4 opinion
authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and joined by Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, the Court held that New Jersey's forcing the
BSA to admit Dale violated the BSA's right to freedom of expressive
association.' Rehnquist began the opinion by noting that "forced inclusion of
an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive
association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.' '
Chief Justice Rehnquist then turned to the substance of the case. He first
discussed whether Dale's presence in the BSA would affect the organization's
ability to express its viewpoints. The New Jersey Supreme Court had found that
"exclusion of members solely on the basis of their sexual orientation is
inconsistent with Boy Scouts' commitment to a diverse and 'representative'
membership ...[and] contradicts Boy Scouts' overarching objective to reach
'all eligible youth"' and that exclusion of homosexuals "appears antithetical to
the organization's goals and philosophy."'9 Rehnquist, however, found that "it
is not the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed values because they
disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent."
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that to force the BSA to grant Dale a
leadership position violated the organization's right of expressive association.

190. Id. at 1228 (quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Club Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987)).
191. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446,2449 (2000).
192. Idat 2451 (citing New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1, 13 (1988)). Chief Justice Rehnquist also cited Roberts and its compelling interest test.
193. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am, 734 A.2d 1196, 1226 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S.
Ct. 2446 (2000).
194. Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2453 (citing Democratic Party of United States v.
Wisconsin exrel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981) ("[A]s is true of all expressions
of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view
a particular expression as unwise or irrational:'); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("[R]eligious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others to merit First Amendment
protection")).
In so holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored the Court's opinion in Duarte
upholding a law forcing Rotary International ("L') to admit women. As we have seen,
the Court, in language reminiscent of the New Jersey Supreme Court's in Dale, claimed
that its ruling would help RI achieve its stated goals ofproviding humanitarian service
and encouraging high ethical standards and help ensure that Rotary Clubs represented a
cross-section of their communities. See supranotes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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The BSA, Rehnquist noted, asserts that it "teaches that homosexual conduct is
' Rehnquist declined to inquire into the sincerity of the
not morally straight."' 95
organization's9 6belief, except to note that the record contained written evidence
of this belief.
The Court concluded that application of the New Jersey law to the BSA
"would significantly burden the [BSA's] right to oppose or disfavor homosexual
conduct.'.. "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force
the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world,
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior."'9 Just as the coerced presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day
parade would have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to propound
a particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
"surely interferes with the Boy Scout's choice not to propound a point of view
contrary to its beliefs."'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the New Jersey Supreme Court's argument
that the BSA's right of expressive association was not infringed because "'Boy
Scout members do not associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief that
homosexuality is immoral; Boy Scouts discourages its leaders from
disseminating any views on sexual issues; and Boy Scouts includes sponsors and
members who subscribe to different views in respect of homosexuality."' 2 "
Rehnquist responded that associations "do not have to associate for the 'purpose'
of disseminating a certain message" to receive First Amendment protection, they
merely have to "engage in expressive activity.""0 ' In Hurley, for example, the
purpose of the St. Patrick's Day parade "was not to espouse any views about
sexual orientation.""2 2 Second, if the BSA wants leaders to "teach only by
example," this is protected by the First Amendment. Finally, "the First
Amendment simply does not require that every member of a group agree on
every issue in order for the group's policy to be 'expressive association."'
Rehnquist added that "[t]he fact that the organization does not trumpet its views
from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean
that its views receive no First Amendment protection.""2 3
Having found that the New Jersey law violated the BSA's First Amendment
rights, Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to distinguish Roberts and Duarte.
Rehnquist noted that these cases suggested that states have a compelling interest

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452.
Id. at 2453.
Id. at 2457.
Id. at 2454.

Id.
Id. (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1223 (N.J. 1999)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2455.
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in eradicating discrimination against any group protected by a public
accommodations statute. "But in each of these cases," Rehnquist explained, the
Court "went on to conclude that the enforcement of these statutes would not
materialy interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to express." '
Therefore, "the organizations' First Amendment rights were not violated by the
application of the States' public accommodations laws," 2 s and the Court's
application of the compelling interest test in Roberts and Duarte was mere
dicta -m
This conclusion is rather remarkable-albeit welcome-given the centrality
of the compelling interest test to the Roberts opinion as vritten,' and the test's
widespread adoption and diffusion through the lower courts. As Dale's
attorneys pointed out, the compelling interest test as applied in Roberts more
closely resembled the liberal balancing test the Court enunciated in UnitedStates
2
v. O'Briene'
to evaluate laws incidentally burdening free speech than it

204. Id. at 2456.
205. Id.
206. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not use the word dicta, but the fact that he failed
to apply the compelling interest test means that in effect he treated the compelling interest
aspects of Roberts and Duarte as dicta.
Chief Justice Rehnquist added some confising dicta of his own to the effect that in
Roberts and Duartethe Court did not stop when it found a compelling state interest, but
went on to determine whether the statute at issue imposed any "serious burden" on the
organization's right of expressive association. Rehnquist then wrote:
In Roberts, we said "[i]ndeed, the Jaycees has failed to demonstrate... any
serious burden on the male members' freedom of expressive association:' In
Duarte, we said: "[I]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose
one's associates can violate the right of association protected by the First
Amendment. In this case, however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that
admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes."
Id at 2456 (citations omitted). This dicta is both unnecessary and unclear. Perhaps
Chief Justice Rehnquist is suggesting that Roberts and Duarte held that only minor,
inconsequential infringements on the First Amendment are subject to the compelling
interest test, whereas "serious burdens" on First Amendment rights are subject to full
First Amendment scrutiny. If that is Rehnquist's point, one hopes he is not implicitly
endorsing such reasoning, but simply trying to avoid explicitly overruling Roberts by
showing that applying its test would not change the result of Dale. Leaving it up to the
courts to decide which burdens are serious and which are not puts far too much discretion
in the hands ofjudges, who will be tempted to allow their social policy preferences to
overcome the appropriate result under the Constitution.
207. Arguably, the compelling interest portion of Roberts was its main holding,
with the Court adding as a secondary point its conclusion that the expressive association
rights of the Jaycees were not infringed.
208. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brienrequired a showing of a "substantial" rather
than a "compelling" state interest to allow First Amendment rights to be infringed in
certain circumstances. Id. at 382.
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resembled the strict scrutiny standard generally associated with the compelling
interest test. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, specifically disavowed the
applicability of O'Brien to cases such as Dale where the right of expressive
association is at issue. 209
Dale thus implicitly overrules the most significant aspects of Justice
Brennan's opinion in Roberts. Dale would be a much less confusing opinion if
the majority had bitten the bullet and explicitly overruled Roberts. Because none
of the Justices in the Dale majority had joined the main Roberts
opinion-Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in Roberts, while, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Scalia were not yet on the Court-it is not clear why the Court
failed to do so. Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist felt bound by his ill-conceived
1'
vote with the pro-compelling interest test majority in Duarte."
In any event, Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that unlike in Roberts and
Duarte,where the Court found no infringement on First Amendment rights, in
Hurley the Court found that the parade organizers' right to express their message
was infringed upon. 21' Hurley, not Roberts, was therefore controlling, and as
in Hurley an antidiscrimination law had to yield to the First Amendment.
C. The Dale Dissents
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by three other Justices, wrote the main
dissent. Stevens argued that forcing the BSA to employ Dale would not impose
any serious burdens on the BSA's ability to achieve its goals. 2 2 Stevens
contended that the BSA at most "simply adopted an exclusionary membership
policy and has no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality."" 3 There is no
basis, therefore, for concluding that admitting homosexuals will impair the
BSA's ability to engage in protected activities or disseminate its views.
According to the dissent, "[t]o prevail in asserting a right of expressive
association as a defense to a charge of violating an antidiscrimination law, the
organization must at least show that it has adopted and advocated an unequivocal
position inconsistent with a position advocated or epitomized by the person
whom the organization seeks to exclude.2 1 4 Otherwise, Justice Stevens wrote,
civil rights legislation would become a nullity, as defendants would engage in
post-hoc rationalizations for discriminatory conduct.2" '

209. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2457 (2000).
210. Justice O'Connor did not take part in Duarte,Justice Scalia concurred without
opinion, and Justices Kennedy and Thomas were not yet on the Court. See Bd. of Dirs.
of Rotary Club Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
211. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
212. Id. at 2462-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 2463.
214. Id. at 2471.
215. Id.
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Justice Stevens distinguished Hurley on the grounds that Dale's
participation in the BSA "sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the
world. Unlike GLIB, Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute
any fact sheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message." 2t 6 The mere act
of joining the BSA is not symbolic speech subject to the First Amendment.
Moreover, the notion that the BSA implicitly endorses the views expressed in a
non-Scouting context on a variety of issues of the hundreds
of thousands of adult
2t 7
volunteers it employs is "simply mind boggling."
Justice Souter wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg, to emphasize that unlike Justice Stevens, who strongly expressed his
distaste for the BSA's policy on gays, he did not believe that the merits of the
BSA's policy was legally relevan 21 8 Souter also emphasized that like Stevens,
he believes that "no group can claim a right of expressive association without
identifying a clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal way." ' 9
"To require less," Souter wrote, "and to allow exemption from a public
accommodations statute based on any individual's difference from an alleged
group ideal, however expressed and however inconsistently claimed, would
convert the right of expressive association into an easy trump of any
antidiscrimination law." ' O In expressive association cases, unlike standard free
speech cases, the Court does not have to accept an individual or group's
declaration of its beliefs at face value.n ' Souter did not justify this distinction,
beyond his expressed concern about the negative effect a broader rule would
have on antidiscrimination laws.
The dissenters thus unfortunately resurrected the tactic of evading conflict
between antidiscrimination laws and the First Amendment by construing the
facts of the case and the underlying constitutional right narrowly to bypass the
conflict. Nevertheless, even the dissents represent significant progress from the
days ofRoberts andDuarte. Justice Stevens's primary dissent did not argue that
even if the BSA's First Amendment rights suffered some incidental
infiingement, that infringement was justified by the government's compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals.m Nor did Justice
Souter use his separate opinion to defend the compelling interest test.

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id at 2465.
Id. at 2476.
Id at 2478-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id at 2479.

220. Id.

221. Id.
222. It is possible that Justice Stevens did not do so because he felt no need; once
he established that the BSA's First Amendment rights were not infringed, the compelling
interest argument was irrelevant. However, Stevens did not go out of his way to be terse
in his opinion. As noted above, he included an aside condemning prejudice against
homosexuals, a point irrelevant, as the other three dissenters pointed out, to the legal
issue in the case.
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Remarkably, none of the nine Justices currently on the Supreme Court
appears to support applying the compelling interest test in conflicts between
antidiscrimination laws and First Amendment civil liberties. While the
dissenters' opinions construe the right of expressive association narrowly, to the
extent such a right is infringed, the right will be enforced by the dissenters.' A
fortiori, the dissenters would also vote to uphold speech rights in the pure
expression cases where some lower courts have applied the compelling interest
test.'
IV. THE PROMISE OF DALE
Dale will undoubtedly be used to protect First Amendment rights when they
are infringed upon by antidiscrimination laws. As discussed below, after Dale
associations that are primarily expressive in nature will be exempt from
antidiscrimination laws when those laws infringe on the associations' ability to
project their messages. Indeed, religious associations will utilize Dale to obtain
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws that they were not able to obtain under
the Free Exercise Clause. Moreover, antidiscrimination laws should no longer
be a threat to freedom of speech in such contexts as hostile environment
litigation and litigation under the Fair Housing Act.
A. Dale and Freedom ofAssociation
Dale did not clearly specify which organizations will receive constitutional
protection on freedom of association grounds from antidiscrimination laws.
However, the scope of Dale's holding is restricted by two factors. First, Dale
is grounded squarely in the First Amendment, not a vague right of association
floating somewhere in the penumbral ether of the Constitution. Only expressive
associations can come under Dale's protective umbrella, and only when their
discriminatory membership criteria relate to a distinct message they seek to
convey or not convey.
Second, in Roberts Justice O'Connor expressed her view that only
associations that are primarilyexpressive, as opposed to commercial, are eligible

223. Under Roberts, by contrast, the Ku Klux Klan did not clearly have the right
to exclude African-Americans, nor was it clear that a Black separatist group had a right
to exclude whites. See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of
Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988) (reaching the conclusion that the KKK had
a constitutional right to exclude African-Americans only by ignoring the majority
opinion in Roberts and relying instead on Justice O'Connor's concurrence); In re
Southgate v. United African Movement, Nos. MPA95 -0851, PA95-0031, 1997 WL
1051933 (N.Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights June 30, 1997) (relying on Roberts in
holding that a Black separatist organization had no right to exclude whites from its
meetings).
224. See supranotes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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for First Amendment exemptions from antidiscrimination lawsY' Even
organizations that engage in a "not insubstantial" amount of expressive activity
are ineligible for First Amendment protection if they are not primarily
expressive. Because Justice O'Connor's vote was necessary to Dale's 5-4
holding, and because there is no reason to believe that she has changed her views
on the issue, Dale's scope is presumably limited to organizations that are
primarily expressive.
Assumedly, to come within the scope of Justice O'Connor's interpretation
of the expressive association aspect of the First Amendment an organization
must at the very least be non-profit. It is difficult to see how a typical for-profit
entity could successfully argue that it exists primarily for non-commercial,
expressive purposes. 6 Thus, contrary to the concerns of some post-Dale
commentators, discriminatory businesses such as the infamous Ollie's
Barbeque2 7 will not be able to rely on Dale to evade antidiscrimination laws.
Among expressive organizations, religious organizations will most likely
be the primary beneficiaries of Dale. Ironically, while the "compelling interest"
language of the Bob Jones free exercise case once bled into the freedom of
association cases, threatening the right of expressive association, Dale's
protection of freedom of associatiof will benefit many organizations attempting
to preserve their free exercise rights.
For a time in the 1980s, when Sherbert was still good law, and Roberts
suggested that an expressive association claim would rarely if ever trump
enforcement of an antidiscrimination law, religious organizations naturally
couched in terms of free exercise their constitutional defenses against
antidiscrimination laws that conflicted with their beliefs. In most instances, the
religious organizations nevertheless lost.' The compelling interest test was
applied too loosely in the free exercise context to be very helpful, and, in any
event, courts consistently held based on Bob Jones and Roberts that the
government has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination. Once the
Supreme Court ruled in Smith that religious individuals and organizations have
no right to be exempted from generally-applicable laws that interfere vth their

225. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 638-40 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
226. Cf. Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985), affd, 389 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1986) (holding that a for-profit health club could
not assert a free exercise right to exclude gay patron). Of course, if a pure speech claim,
rather than an expressive association claim is at issue, for-profit organizations do come
within the ambit of First Amendment protections.
227. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (unanimously upholding
against a challenge by Ollie's Barbeque congressional authority to regulate public
accommodations).
228. See supra notes 41-46, 131 and accompanying text.
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religious beliefs, religious organizations seemed at the mercy of legislative
whim.n 9
Dale, however, gives religious organizations newfound autonomy from
certain antidiscrimination laws, autonomy that in many instances is far broader
than anything such organizations won under Sherbert. Recall that under Dale
if an antidiscrimination law "materially interferes" with an organization's ability
to express ideas, the law is unconstitutional as applied." With that in mind,
consider Frederick Gedicks' explanation of the issues facing religious groups
confronted with legal mandates that violate the groups' tenets:
The group that refuses to change a core concern to comply with valid
regulation may be liquidated and cease physically and legally to exist.
The group that chooses to abandon a core concern in order to comply
with regulation alters its definitional boundaries, thereby transforming
itself into a different group. In either event, the group has ceased to
be, having been extinguished by the government's regulatory
intervention."
In other words, forcing a religious organization to comply with
antidiscrimination legislation that violates its beliefs destroys the rights of the
organization
and its members to expressive association, the very right at issue in
2
Dale3
Gay Rights Coalitionof Georgetown UniversityLaw Center v. Georgetown
Universio 33 illustrates the effect Dale is likely to have on the rights of religious
' 4
groups. Georgetown University refused to extend "University Recognition' 1

229. Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), did not, however, affect the absolute privilege religious organizations have
to select their "ministers" free from government interference or second-guessing. See
EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
230. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2454 (2000).
231. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a ConstitutionalJurisprudenceofReligious
GroupRights, 1989 Wis. L. REV.99, 112.
232. Professor Ira Lupu anticipated that many free exercise cases would ultimately
be construed as expressive association cases. See Ira C. Lupu, FreeExerciseExemption
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination,67 B.U. L. REV,
391,395-404 (1987).
233. 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987).
234. "University Recognition" was the second highest level in a three tier system
of official recognition of student organizations at Georgetown. Id, at 9. "Student Body
Endorsement" was given by the Student Activities Committee ("SAC") to any
organization that met certain size and composition requirements with objectives "within
the scope of the student body interest and concern, serving an educational, social, or
cultural purpose." Id. University Recognition required the approval of the university
administration and was available only to organizations that had achieved "Student Body

Endorsement" and that satisfied two additional criteria: the organization must "be
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to two gay student groups. 3 5 Although the university permitted the groups to
meet on university property and to invite guest speakers, it repeatedly denied
"University Recognition" as inconsistent with Catholic beliefs about sexual

ethics. 3 6

The two groups sued the university alleging violations of Washington,
D.C.'s Human Rights Act. The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed that a religious
organization such as Georgetown could not be compelled to endorse a student
group that encouraged or accepted homosexuality.3 7 However, the court found
that the Act did not require Georgetown to endorse or accept the goals of the gay
student groups. Rather the university merely had to extend the same benefits to
them that it offered to other student groups.38 According to the court, although
the scheme of "University Recognition" offered by Georgetown did include an
element of endorsement of recognized organizations, that endorsement could be
severed from the tangible benefits that came with Recognition."
The court assumed arguendo that these requirements burdened
Georgetown's free exercise of religion.2' After a lengthy discussion of the
legislative history of the Act and psychological and sociological research into
homosexuality and anti-gay discrimination, the court determined that the District
of Columbia had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination based on
sexual orientation.24 The court next found that the Act imposed a relatively
minor burden on Georgetown's exercise of religion; the university already
provided limited benefits to the gay groups and the additional tangible benefits
& 2
were "relatively insignificant" according to the university's own brief.
'
Finally, the court concluded that enforcing the Act's requirements of equal
access to "facilities and services" without requiring endorsement was the least

successful in aiding the University's educational mission in the tradition established by
its founders" and must provide a broad service to the University community as a whole.
Id The third tier, "University Funding," was available only to groups that had already
achieved "University Recognition." Id. at 10. Groups vith "Student Body
Endorsement" may meet on university property, apply for lecture funding, use campus
advertising, receive financial counseling from the SAC, and petition the student
government for assistance. Id. The additional tangible benefits of "University
Recognition" include use of a mailbox in the SAC office and other mailing services, the
right to use a computer labeling service, and the right to apply for university funding.
Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 10-14.
237. Id. at 18-19.
238. Id. at 21.
239. Id. at 20.
240. Id at 31.
241. Id. at38.
242. Id. Perversely, the fact that Georgetown was tolerant of its gay students
apparently meant that it received less constitutional protection than would be granted to
a virulently anti-gay school.
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restrictive way of advancing the District's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination based on sexual orientation.243
Contrast this decision with the necessary result of the same fact scenario
under Dale. Dale held that the BSA has the right to completely exclude Dale
from scouting because of his open homosexual orientation even though there
was no evidence that Dale would use his position to advocate, or even talk about,
gay rights, or homosexuality more generally. A fortiori, Georgetown and
similarly situated religious universities that otherwise do not discriminate against
gay students have the right to deny funding and office space to student
organizations explicitly organized to promote views on sexual issues that conflict
with the universities' religious values. Forcing Georgetown to subsidize such
groups would impair the university's ability to convey its Catholic message
regarding sexuality far more clearly than employing Dale as a volunteer would
impair the Boy Scouts' subtle anti-homosexual activity message.
Similarly, under Dale religious schools have a right to refuse to employ
individuals whose actions conflict with the schools' religious tenets, at least if
those individuals will be in a position to be perceived as role models. Thus, for
example, contrary to the holdings of three federal courts,2' church schools have
a constitutional right to fire teachers who become pregnant out of wedlock if sex
outside of marriage is frowned upon by the sponsoring church. 5 Churches that
243. Id.at 39; cf Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472 N.W.2d. 355
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (overturning administrative ruling and holding that a Catholic
organization could not be required by antidiscrimination law to rent space to a
homosexual organization that refused to attest that it accepted church teachings on
homosexuality; holding based on "excessive entanglement" of government in religious
affairs).
For scholarly commentary on the Georgetown case, see Fernand N. Dutile, Godand
Gays at Georgetown: Observationson Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University

Law Center v. Georgetown University, 15 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1988); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out ": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of
Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2431-38 (1997);

Linda J.Lacey, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University: ConstitutionalValues
on a Collision Course, 64 OR. L. REV. 409 (1986); Paul E. O'Connell, Comment, Gay
Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University: Failure to Recognize a Catholic
University's Religious Liberty, 32 CATH. LAW. 170 (1988).
244. See Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 1998);

Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Dolter v.
Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266,271 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
245. See generally Robert John Araujo, "The Harvest is PlentifulBut the Laborers
areFew": HiringPracticesand Religiously Affiliated Universities,30 U. RICH, L. REV.

713, 733 (1996) ("I suggest that a religiously affiliated school can refuse to hire a
candidate or can discharge an employee whose personal conduct counters the religious
tenets of the school."); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses,
81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146, 160 (1986) ("If the state can compel a religious institution to
rehire a person to a teaching position despite that person's departure from religious
doctrine, then the church loses the ability to control its voice.").
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teach that mothers should stay at home with young children may similarly refuse
to employ women with young children.2 6 Religious schools will be entitled to
exemptions in appropriate circumstances from California's Leonard Law, which
prohibits private schools from punishing speech that could not be
constitutionally punished in a public school.24
On the other hand, free exercise claims that do not involve expressive
association by non-profit entities will not be affected by Dale. Thus, Dalesays
nothing, for example, about whether religious individuals can be required to rent
to unmarried couples,248 at least not directly. 49 Nor is Dalelikely to affect cases

246. See Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932
(6th Cir. 1985), rev'don ripenessgrounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (holding, pre-Smith, that
such a right existed under the free exercise clause); McLeod v. Providence Christian
Sch., 408 N.W.2d 146, 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that any such right was
overridden by the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination).
These claims may also be subject to a pre-Smith compelling interest test. See
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Under Smith,
the compelling interest test still applies to so-called hybrid claims, where a party asserts
a free exercise in combination with other constitutional protections. Id. at 881. The
Court specifically referenced a situation in which free exercise of religion was asserted
in conjunction with the right of parents to guide the education of their children, id. (citing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), a situation that arises in cases where religious
schools discipline female teachers for failing to obey church rules. However, church
schools are more likely to succeed under Dale's absolutist First Amendment test than
under the weak free exercise compelling interest test.
247. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950 (West 1993); see also Bernstein, supra note
24.
248. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 914
(Cal. 1996) (holding that a statute barring discrimination on basis of marital status does
not implicate landlord's free exercise of religion); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d
743, 751 (Il. App. Ct.) (holding that the government's compelling interest overcame
landlord's free exercise defense), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997); State by Cooper
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6, 9-11 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the statute at issue does not
cover marital status discrimination; three out of the four judges in the majority argue that
the statute would be unconstitutional as a violation of free exercise rights if it required
religious landlords to rent to unmarried couples).
Religious landlords may have a right not to rent to unmarried couples under the
hybrid claims aspect of Smith, subject to the compelling interest test. See Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
religious landlords had a constitutional right to refuse to rent to unmarried couples,
finding a hybrid free exercise/property rights claim), dismissedon ripeness grounds,220
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, landlords may also have such a right in states that
continue to apply a compelling interest test to free exercise claims despite Smith. See
McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723,729-30 (Mich. 1998), vacated,593 N.W.2d 545,

545 (1999) (reversing previous holding that compelling interest test under state
constitution is satisfied by the government's interest in eliminating housing
discrimination against unmarried couples). But cf. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274,283 (Alaska 1994) (holding that a state law requiring landlords
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in which religious employers prohibit the employment of those whose lifestyles
conflict with the owner's beliefs." Whether religious organizations will be
allowed to bind employees to contracts that comport with the organizations'
beliefs but violate antidiscrimination laws remains to be seen. For example,
several cases have arisen in which Christian organizations paid married men
higher wages than women based on their "head of household" status.2", Most
likely, courts will hold that wage payments are not "expression" or "speech" for
purposes of the First Amendment. 2
B. Dale and Freedom ofSpeech
As noted previously,5 3 hostile environment law is increasingly infinging

on First Amendment rights. Several courts have held that such infringement is
justified by the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
in employment. 4
The Supreme Court will inevitably hear a case in which hostile environment
law and First Amendment prerogatives conflict. Already, in Davis v. Monroe

to rent to unmarried couples is subject to a compelling interest test under the Alaska
constitution, but that the law must be upheld because Alaska has a compelling interest
in eradicating discrimination against unmarried couples).
One commentator suggests that if the compelling interest test is applied in such
cases, the state should at a minimum have to produce evidence showing:
1) historical and pervasive discrimination against unmarried couples; 2) the
number of cohabiting couples and religiously motivated landlords; 3) the
number of rental units not available because of the religious convictions of
these landlords; 4) the length of time it takes to find appropriate housing; and
5) the types of housing available to unmarried cohabitants as an alternative.
Michael V. Hernandez, The Right of Religious Landlords to Exclude Unmarried
Cohabitants: Debunkingthe Myth of the Tenant's "New Clothes ", 77 NEB. L. REV. 494,

560 (1998).
249. To the extent that Dale sends a signal to lower courts to take civil liberties
claims more seriously when antidiscrimination laws are at issue, Dale may cause courts
in jurisdictions that apply the compelling interest test in cases involving general laws that
happen to infringe on free exercise to apply the test more stringently.
250. See State v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) (involving
an employer who refused to hire single women working without their fathers' consent).
251. E.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990);
EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
252. See generally Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and SelfRealization: First Amendment Principles and AntidiscriminationLaws, 76 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 189, 348 (1999) ("employment and housing are almost certain to be
characterized as commercial and public, two factors deemed important to the existence
or scope of associational interests").
253. See supranotes 139-41 and accompanying text.
254. See supranotes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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County Board of Education,' a case holding that peer harassment in schools
violates federal law, four dissenting Justices repeatedly observed that sexual
harassment law often conflicts with the First AmendmentY5
No First Amendment claim was at issue in Davis. The fact that the
dissenters raised the issue several times suggests that they are troubled by the
growing conflict between hostile environment law and freedom of speech. Of
course, one cannot definitively predict what the Court wll hold in whatever case
eventually comes before it. But after Hurley and Dale,one can be reasonably
certain that the Court, unlike several lower courts,' will not conclude that a
party's First Amendment rights can be infringed upon because of the
government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination. Rather, if a
hostile environment claim survives Supreme Court scrutiny despite a First
Amendment challenge it will be because the defendant was unable to persuade
the Court that First Amendment rights were infringed.
Hostile environment law is not the only place where freedom of speech has
conflicted with antidiscrimination laws. The controversy over campus speech
codes, enacted in part to respond to federal civil rights laws." is well-known,
and will be discussed no further here.'

255. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
256. Id. at 654-86. First, the Justices noted that "[a] university's power to
discipline its students for speech that may constitute sexual harassment is also
circumscribed by the First Amendment. A number of federal courts have already
confronted difficult problems raised by university speech codes designed to deal with
peer sexual and racial harassment" Id. at 667 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Later, the
dissenters added that "[a]t the college level, the majority's holding is sure to add fuel to
the debate over campus speech codes that, in the name ofpreventing a hostile educational
environment, may infringe students' First Amendment rights.' Id. at 682. Finally, the
dissenters pointed out that "a student's claim that the school should remedy a sexually
hostile environment will conflict with the alleged harasser's claim that his speech, even
if offensive, is protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 683; see also DeAngelis v. El
Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Where pure
expression is involved, Title VII steers into the territory of the First Amendment.").
257. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
258. For a detailed rundown, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech vs.
Workplace HarassmentLaw-A Growing Conflict, at httpJiwww.law.ucla.edulfaculty/
volokhiharass/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
259. Hostile educational environments are unlawful under Title IX of the 1972
Education Amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
The Department of Education's guidelines for Title IX require universities to ensure that
minorities and women do not face "hostile environments" on campus, or the universities
face the loss of federal funds. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of
Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034,
12,038 (1997).
260. For further discussion, see Bernstein, supranote 22, at 143-44.
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Much less well-known is that during the early years of the Clinton
Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
equated organized citizen opposition to proposed group homes that would house
members of protected groups with illegal housing discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act." HUD's interpretation of the Fair Housing Act led to some of the
most brazen government assaults on free speech rights in recent American
history. HUD's actions cannot be directly attributed to judicial precedent.
However, they provide both troubling evidence of sentiment at the highest levels
of government to sacrifice freedom of speech to antidiscrimination concerns, and
indicate that at least some HUD and Justice Department officials thought that
post-Roberts courts would stand by while the executive branch eviscerated the
First Amendment.
One example of HUD's antics should suffice. Three residents of a
Berkeley, California neighborhood opposed a plan to renovate a rundown hotel
for use as a homeless center.262 In newsletters and petitions they claimed the
location of the proposed center, near two liquor stores and a nightclub, was
inappropriate because of the prevalence of alcoholism among the homeless
population.263 The three objected to the lack of mental health and substance
abuse treatment in the proposed program. 2" They also unsuccessfully sued the
zoning board alleging a conflict of interest.265 Despite their efforts and the
opposition of others in the neighborhood, the city approved the facility.2 "
Marianne Lawless, director of Housing Rights, Inc., a federally-fimded
housing advocacy group, filed a complaint with HUD claiming the three had
opposed the project because the residents might be mentally disabled or former
substance abusers. 67 Both groups are considered to have disabilities and
therefore are protected under the Fair Housing Act. . In the course of
investigating the complaint HUD issued subpoenas for anything the three
Berkeley residents had written on the matter, minutes of public meetings, lists
of members of their coalition, and any other relevant documents.268 The

261. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994 & Supp. 2000). The FHA
prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, handicap, or
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
262. See Heather MacDonald, FreeHousing Yes, Free Speech No, WALL ST. J.,

Aug. 8, 1994, at A12.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See Janet Wells, Housing DiscriminationProbe Upsets Berkeley Officials,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 1994, at A18.
267. Id.

268. MacDonald, supra note 262, at A12. Asking for a list of members
contravened NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 466 (1958)
(holding that an expressive association could not be compelled to reveal its membership
to the government).
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Berkeley three were warned that failure to comply with the document requests
could result in fines of up to $100,000 each and a jail sentence of up to one
year. If the investigation turned up evidence of discrimination, they would be
subject to fines of270
up to $50,000 each and might be liable for compensatory and
punitive damages.

HUD's preliminary investigation concluded that the three had broken the
law.27 ' HUD spokesperson John Phillips demonstrated HUD's contempt for
freedom of speech by explaining in response to free speech concerns that "[tio
ask questions is one thing. To write brochures and articles and go out and
actively organize people to say, 'We don't want those people in those structures,'
is another." 272
Incidents similar to those involving the Berkeley three occurred across the
country.273 One victim of HUD harassment summed up the effects of HUD's
investigation as follows:
It financially ruined the neighborhood association and terrified
residents. HUD investigators pressured neighbors to turn informer.
Residents were afraid to join the association or to speak out at public
meetings. The government even tried to deprive us of legal
representation by threatening to call our attorney as a witness.
We couldn't take minutes at meetings of our board because these
could be seized and used as evidence against us. We tried to settle the
case, but the terms of the consent decree drafted by the government
were intolerable. They would have required residents to undergo an
enforced course of political re-education and proposed
unconstitutional restraints on our right to speak, write and
association.274

269. MacDonald, supranote 262, at A12.
270. MacDonald, supranote 262, at A12.
271. See Susan Ferriss, FreeSpeech Advocates Finda Fight In Berkeley: HUD
Investigating3 Residents ForBias Against Mentally Ill in Remarks, Letters Protesting

Projects,S.F. EXAMINER, July 22, 1994, at A6.
272. Id
273. See Sigfredo A. Cabrera, HUD Continues Its Assault on Free Speech, WALL
ST. J., June 7, 1995, at A15; Lou Chapman, Free Speech An Issue in Suit Against
Ridgmar Group, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 19, 1994, at 27; Editorial,
IntimidatingPoliticalProtest,WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at A16; Edmund Mahony,
JudgeDismissesSuit AgainstNeighborhood,HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 12, 1995, at B1;
Joyce Price, FederalGovernment Sues Fivefor FightingGroup Home: Act of Getting
a RestrainingOrder CalledDiscriminatory,WASH. TIMES, May 31, 1995, at A3; Joyce
Price, HUD Sues Texans in Home-Sale Battle Citizens Fought to Stop Deal in 1991,
WASH. IMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at A4; Brian J. Taylor, No Retreatin Feds' Faron Free
Speech, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 19, 1994, at Fl.
274. Mahony, supranote 273, at B.
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After a media outcry over HUD's refusal to respect First Amendment
rights,275 HUD announced new guidelines for its field offices. The department
would no longer investigate "any complaint... that involves public activities
that are directed toward achieving action by a governmental entity or official;
and do not involve force, physical harm, or a clear threat of force or physical
harm to one or more individuals." 6 The department also announced that it was
dropping the investigation of the Berkeley incident2 because,
it concluded, the
7
citizens were acting within their free-speech rights.

Assistant Attorney General Deval Patrick, however, was unapologetic. He
had previously written a letter to a judge arguing that "Congress intended the
[Fair Housing Act] to proscribe any speech if it leads to discrimination
prohibited by the FHA."' In a letter to the Washington Post,Patrick responded

275. See, e.g., Editorial, Free the Berkeley Three: HUD vs. Free Speech,
VIRGINiAN-PILOT, Aug. 18, 1994, at A20; Editorial, No More Speech Police, BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 3, 1994, at 12; Editorial, IntimidatingPoliticalProtest,supranote 273,
at A16; MacDonald, supra note 262; Justin Raimondo, The Hidden Agenda ofRadical
Egalitarians,S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 17, 1994, at A17.
276. Memorandum from Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Sec'y for Fair Hous. &
Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. (Sept. 2, 1994) (on file with

author).
277. See Roberta Achtenberg, Sometimes on a Tightrope at HUD, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 1994, at A17.
The Berkeley three then successfully sued HUD and some of its employees for
constitutional violations. See White v. Julian, No. C-95-1757MHP, 1996 WL 40192,
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1996), availableat http'//www.cir-usa.org/white.html (visited July 21,
2000), aff'd, 227 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2000). The court denied qualified immunity to
individual HUD employees, concluding that their conduct was clearly unconstitutional.
Id.
The few other cases that have squarely addressed the First Amendment issue have
been decided in favor of the protestors and against HUD and private organizations
seeking to suppress speech. See Salisbury House, Inc. v. McDermott, No. CIV.A.96-CV6486, 1998 WL 195693, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998) ("Although [the neighbors']
views reflect an ill-advised, distasteful form of 'not in my backyard'-ism, the Defendants
have the right under the First Amendment to express themselves without fear of
prosecution."); Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (holding that neighbors' opposition to group home for mentally disabled
adults was protected by the First Amendment); United States v. Wagner, Civ. No. 3:94CV-2540-H, 1995 WL 841924, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1995) ("the Court cannot,
without contravening the protections of the First Amendment, permit the Paragraph 14
claims against Defendants on the grounds that they engaged in protest
activities-leafleting, petitioning, and soliciting-against the placement of a group home
in their subdivision"). However, the Roberts compelling interest argument does not seem
to have been made in any of these cases. Pre-Dale,such an argument may have been
successful.
278. Achtenberg, supra note 277, at A17.
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to criticism of the Justice Department's action in a Fair Housing case in Fort
Worth, Texas:
The problem wasn't the repugnant views expressed in leaflets and
court filings; they were mere instrumentalities in a concerted effort to
coerce and intimidate the seller in violation of the Fair Housing Act
and Texas law.
Baseball bats are perfectly legal too. But if you wield one to keep
people out of the neighborhood, we are going to use the bat as
evidence of your intent to violate the civil rights laws."'
Mr. Patrick correctly asserted that the Fair Housing Act outlaws conduct
protected by the First Amendment. Under the Act, it is illegal "[t]o make, print,
or publish... any notice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin,
or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination '
Lobbying against a halfway house or drug rehabilitation center arguably
constitutes making a statement expressing a preference that groups considered
"handicapped" be denied housing. Of course, Patrick should have recognized
that HUD and the Justice Department are obligated to respect constitutional
rights, even in the face of a conflicting antidiscrimination statute.
Fortunately, the public-or at least the media and a few influential
congressmen-was sufficiently troubled by the consequences for the First
Amendment of enforcing this aspect of the Act that HUD and the Justice
Department had to back off, though HUD is still occasionally accused of
attempting to intimidate neighborhood opponents of group housing. T ' However,

279. Deval L. Patrick, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1996, at A24.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1994). Under Section § 3604(f)(I), it is illegal:
To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of (A) that
buyer or renter (3)
a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling
after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with
that buyer or renter.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (1994). Two courts have held that neighbors who filed lawsuits
against the transfer of property could be held liable under this section of the Act. See
United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1559-62 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that the
opposition of neighbors to the sale of a residential property because of the disabilities of
the prospective occupants violated the FHA); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R., 752
F. Supp. 1152, 1167-70 (D.P.R 1990) (holding that the filing of a non-frivolous state
court suit violated the FHA because it was done with discriminatory intent). The
application of the FHA to neighbors was criticized in Michigan Protection& Advocacy
Service, Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695,714 n.39 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aftd, 18 F.3d 337
(6th Cir. 1994). The First Amendment issue was not raised in these cases.
281. See, e.g., Township of W. Orange v. Whitman, 8 F. Supp. 2d 408 (1998)
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there is no guarantee that the results of the political process will be the same in
the future. As the scope of antidiscrimination laws has grown, the political
constituency supporting
such laws at the expense of constitutional rights has
282
grown apace.
The potential failures of the political process made it imperative that the
Supreme Court establish a strong precedent that would protect First Amendment
liberties from antidiscrimination laws in the future. Dale appears to be just such
a precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
For decades, legal scholarship has been full of denunciations of "judicial
activism."" The volume of literature on judicial activism has obscured
instances where the Court has erred in the opposite direction, abdicating its
responsibility to limit government power to its constitutional boundaries. There
are few more extreme examples of such judicial abdication than Roberts.
The Roberts Court implicitly gave lower courts permission to tendentiously
evade clear conflicts between the First Amendment and antidiscrimination laws
in order to ensure that enforcement of antidiscrimination laws was not disturbed
by constitutional niceties.2" The Court compounded this transgression by
holding that to the extent the antidiscrimination law at issue in Roberts did
infringe First Amendment rights, it was subject only to a feeble compelling
interest test.
The Court did not explain why antidiscrimination laws are entitled to
special constitutional treatment, why the facts of Roberts established a
"compelling" case for government involvement, or why a single state's claimed
interest in eliminating discrimination not banned by federal law trumped federal
(local citizens accuse HUD of attempting to intimidate them into relinquishing their First
Amendment rights, and request injunction protecting their rights).
282. Even the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") is increasingly
abandoning its civil libertarian principles when antidiscrimination laws are at issue. See
David E. Bernstein, IndividualLiberty Replaced by SpecialRights: The ACLUHas Lost
its Way, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 16, 2000, at A8. To take just one example, the
ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of Dale, rejecting the Boy Scouts' claimed right
to expressive association. Id. By contrast, as late as 1972 the ACLU promulgated a
policy on "private organizations" stating that "private associations and organizations, as
such, lie beyond the legitimate concern of the state and are constitutionally protected
against governmental interference." See WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, THE TWILIGHT OF
LIBERTY 131 (1993).
283. For many years, such criticism of the judiciary was largely a conservative
province. More recently, with a conservative Supreme Court aggressively invalidating
congressional legislation, liberals have joined the chorus denouncing judges who
allegedly exceed their proper authority.

284. The Court had done the same thing, albeit less egregiously, in Runyon v.
McCrary,427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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constitutional rights. The Court abdicated its role as guardian of constitutional
rights in favor of what it considered to be sound social policy, again implicitly
inviting lower courts to do the same.
The result was that First Amendment liberties came under increasing assault
as lower court judges applied and extended Roberts. Such abdication ofjudicial
duty to enforce the First Amendment should be at least as objectionable and
scary to legal commentators as judicial activism. Not only do judges have a
constitutional duty to enforce the First Amendment, but, for reasons this Author
has elaborated upon elsewherel 5 protection of the rights to free speech, free
exercise, and free association is extremely important, including and especially
for members of minority groups.
These First Amendment liberties are most in need of judicial protection
when set against an extremely popular cause, such as antidiscrimination laws.
Yet the Roberts Court not only seemed content to leave to their fate those who,
by exercising their First Amendment rights, threatened to limit the enforcement
of such laws, but also suggested that the First Amendment must be suspended
until the utopian goal of eliminating discrimination is achieved; in other words,
the First Amendment must be suspended forever.
Dale suggests that the Roberts era is thankfully over, and that the nine
Justices of the Supreme Court, though retaining a level of disagreement on the
scope of the right of expressive association, unanimously believe that
antidiscrimination laws must be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as
other important laws with broad popular support. Those of us who agree with
the fundamental premise of the First Amendment-that government cannot be
trusted to establish and fairly police the boundaries of acceptable speech,
expressive association, and religious expression-can now rest a little easier.

285. See Bernstein, supranote 22, at 176-77, 188-92, 193-96.
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